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Executive summary 
Kosovo is struggling in its attempt to develop into a liberal democratic state, and on 
its path toward EU membership. The rule of law has not yet been consolidated. 
Corruption is connected to the lack of economic growth, and is hindering domestic 
progress. The political system is made up by hierarchal, close- knit structures of 
power, and lacks clear ideological basis. This is hindering a real democratic process 
from taking place, along with the lack of transparency and accountability.  
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Map of Kosovo 
 
 
 
 
Source: Classroomclipart 2009, Kosovo, at, http://classroomclipart.com/clipart-
view/Clipart/Black_and_White_Clipart/Maps/Kosovo_map_15Rbw_jpg.htm (accessed on 8 May 2014)  
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1.0 Introduction 
Kosovo declared independence in 2008, and has since then tried to establish a state 
within the international system of sovereign states. Kosovo has to this date been 
recognized by 109 UN member states, including 23 EU member states.1 Although a 
majority of UN members have recognized the Republic of Kosovo – including the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany - many of the UN 
members have declined to do so, including Russia, which is permanent member of 
the Security Council and an old ally of Serbia.2 Serbia’s resistance to this act of 
independence has diverse motivations, but is grounded in the Serbian constitution of 
2006, which declares Kosovo an integral and inalienable part of Serbia. It seems that 
this is, however, not the only problem, which prevents Kosovo from becoming a full 
member of the international community.  
 This thesis will look at different limitations affecting Kosovo, which potentially 
might obstruct Kosovo in its quest to join international organizations, such as the 
European Union. As presented above the challenges/ obstacles are found externally, 
but there are also domestic ones.  
 While the rest of post- socialist Europe was building political institutions in 
newly independent states, Yugoslavia fractured into half a dozen states, with war 
affecting the region for most of a decade, starting with clashes in Slovenia in June 
1991 and ending with the Albanian insurrection in Macedonia in spring 2001.3 Over 
the last decade Kosovo has been passing through a fundamental transformation 
process. The domestic situation inside Kosovo involves unavoidable challenges. 
Whether Kosovo’s politicians are actually trying to establish a stable liberal 
democratic system, may be contested, but there are reasons to believe that this is 
the case, widespread corruption not withstanding. Domestic obstacles are hindering 
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Kosovo’s attempt to be perceived as a liberal democracy. The accomplishment of a 
stable democratic system is crucial for Kosovo’s future, both for domestic stability 
and for European integration.4 The politicians in Kosovo are trying to be perceived as 
liberal democrats internationally.  
 Kosovo’s present domestic and external obstacles are the subject of this 
thesis. The method that will be applied to look at Kosovo’s limitations is a 
comparative method. The research question to be examined in this thesis is:  
 
What obstacles does Kosovo now face to fully become a member of the international 
community of sovereign states – and the European Union? 
 
This thesis will examine Kosovo’s barriers, both domestic and external, in the way for 
Kosovo to fully become fully accepted as a member of the international community of 
sovereign states, and enter the European Union. The following part of the 
introduction will define liberal democracy, and look at what such as system entails. 
The central argument of this thesis being that for Kosovo to become fully a 
recognized member of the international community, and to enter the EU, the 
prerequisite is to develop a liberal democracy. The other important part of this 
introduction is the Copenhagen criteria for integration into the European Union. The 
Copenhagen criteria have to be satisfied before negotiations for membership to the 
EU can begin, thereon Kosovo will need to fulfil these.  
 The first part of this thesis will look at the domestic situation in Kosovo, and 
the challenges it has to meet if it is to develop a liberal democracy. The main areas of 
focus of this part will be the political situation, civil society, the economic situation, 
corruption, and human rights. Kosovo is struggling to achieve a system based upon 
the rule of law, and due to a homogeneous political spectrum real democracy is 
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difficult to achieve. Domestic challenges are hindering Kosovo’s establishment of a 
liberal democracy in the eyes of the international community, and are further 
hindering Kosovo’s development both internally and externally.  
 The second part of this thesis will deal with Kosovo’s external challenges. 
Kosovo has struggled in regards to achieving full sovereignty, and receiving full 
recognition, ever since its declaration of independence. The division in the 
international community, and the lack of consensus in dealing with the issue of 
Kosovo has created a hindrance for the participation on the international scene of 
sovereign states. Due to this, Kosovo’s claim of statehood is contested. Kosovo thus 
finds itself in an unusual position of having been neither effectively accepted, nor 
rejected, by the international community at large.5 Kosovo has entered a grey zone of 
international politics, rather than assuming a recognized place in the community of 
nations.6 One of these problems is its non-membership in the United Nations. While 
many countries have recognized Kosovo, it cannot enter into the United Nations until 
Russia is prepared to lift its opposition.7 This part will also deal with its relationship to 
Serbia, and the first agreement signed in April 2013. The relationship between 
Kosovo and Serbia has had an unsatisfactory character, and has hindered Kosovo’s 
ability to move forward.8 With Kosovo declaring independence, Belgrade has 
continued to insist that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. Simultaneously to 
Kosovo’s attempt to move forward, Serbia is also in the process of EU integration. 
However, there are several problems regarding the inter-state relationship between 
the two entities. One of them is the issue of Northern Kosovo, which has created a 
division within Kosovar society. Serbia has held that it will never recognize Kosovo’s 
independence.9 Finally, this thesis will look at Kosovo’s relationship to the EU, and its 
prospects of becoming accepted as an EU member. Kosovo’s progress toward 
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integration into the European Union is set in motion, but there are still both external 
and domestic challenges that need to be met before it is granted membership. 
 Kosovo’s external challenges are closely connected to the domestic 
challenges, with both external and domestic challenges having an impact upon 
development toward the development of a proper liberal democratic state.  
  
1.1 Liberal democracy  
By definition, democracy means the rule of the people, and entails that citizens have 
a central part in governing of the state.10 Ramet defines democracy as, “a system 
based on the principles of political choice and social tolerance.” Democracy provides 
institutional protection “of the legal, political and social equality of all adult citizens”.11 
According to Ramet, the factors which are necessary in a democratic state are: 
multiparty elections, an uncensored press, the separation of powers, an informed 
public, and campaign funding from government, rather than from corporate sources.  
The inclusion of an informed public entails that people are in position to advance their 
perceived interests during elections and avoid voting for propositions that they would 
find unwelcome, and that the government and corporations not holding information 
back which is in their interest to know.12 Along similar lines, Diamond, Lipset and Linz 
emphasise three essential conditions for democracy: meaningful competition among 
political parties for positions of government power, free and regular elections and civil 
and political liberties. These liberties include freedom of expression and press, and 
the freedom to join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political 
competition and participation.13 Schumpeter emphasises on the presence of political 
institutions that regulates and guarantee the roles of government and opposition.14   
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 Schumpeter’s notion of representative democracy emphasises the role of 
competitive parties, and that there is a selection of alternative candidates for office.15  
Similarly, Diamond, Lipset and Linz hold opposition to the government to be a crucial 
element in a democracy.16 It is a crucial part of a democracy that there is a selection 
of alternative candidates for office, according to Di Palma. 17 Political parties within a 
democracy should built diverse national support.18 There should exist a choice for the 
people in the elections between different candidates and different politics.  
 Another crucial element of a democracy is the economic situation.19 Economic 
growth is essential for a functioning democracy, which is both legitimate and 
effective.20 Di Palma argues that economic prosperity is necessary in democracy, 
without which nations undertaking democratization fall short of qualities that have 
classically been associated with Western democracy.21 “There is a strong 
relationship between the level of per capita income and the survival of democratic 
regimes”, according to Ian Shapiro.22  
 Zakaria argues that, for a democracy to be stable, it should also have a liberal 
character. Some democratically elected regimes are routinely ignoring constitutional 
rights, and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms; he refers to them as 
illiberal democracies - in other words, political systems, which are defined not simply 
by free and fair elections, but by deficiency in the rule of law, lack of toleration, and  a 
lack of a commitment to equality, or to the protection of basic liberties of speech, 
assembly, religion, and property.23 
  Liberal democracy is a form of political rule that balances the principles of 
limited government against the ideal of popular consent, according to Heywood. 
Liberalism guarantees liberty, and citizens’ protection against the state. This is 
assured in the constitution, along with the basic principles of democracy, as the 
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factors presented above.24 According to Ramet, the liberal project involves the 
following factors: the rule of law, individual rights and duties, tolerance of difference 
in religion, life styles, and culture, respect for the harm principle,25 equality, and 
neutrality of the state in matters of religion.26 To ensure a liberal democracy, certain 
internal factors are necessary as seen here. As already noted, there needs to be a 
stable economy; a system based on the rule of law, separation of powers, the 
protection of liberal values, and transparent government institutions. Thus, Kosovo’s 
attempt to now establish a liberal democracy entails more than simply arranging for 
elections. Moreover, as Inglehart and Welzel notes, “one cannot assume that making 
democracy work is simply a matter of having the right constitutional arrangements.”27 
Liberal democracy is a form of representative democracy that operates under the 
principle of liberalism. “If a democracy does not preserve liberty and law, that it is a 
democracy is a small consolidation.”28 
 Liberal democracy is an important part of integration into the international 
community of sovereign states. Democracy is not simply a possible form of political 
government, but is rather seen as a way of life: the only way compatible with the 
present - more importantly a necessity to become included and fully accepted in the 
international community.29  Feltes holds the process of democratization as a 
prerequisite for the effective functioning and long- term stability of any modern state 
and economy.30 But as Ramet points out “Kosovo would seem to have quite a 
distance to traverse before it can hope to have achieved a stable, liberal 
democracy”.31 
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1.2 Copenhagen criterion  
The criteria laid out for potential EU candidates, and especially in the case of Kosovo 
can be defined as criteria for the establishment of a liberal democratic state. 
According to the Treaty of the European Union, Article 2, “The Union is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail.”32  
 The Copenhagen criteria have to be satisfied before negotiations for 
membership to the EU can begin; this is confirmed in Article 49: “Any European State 
which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them 
may apply to become a member of the Union.”33 In effect, this means that potential 
members should have completed the transition and moved convincingly toward 
democratic consolidation. The EU requires a functioning civil society, which is 
essential in a liberal democratic state.34 In addition to the political criteria of the 
Copenhagen, there is the economic criterion. The EU demands a functioning market 
economy, and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and forces within 
the Union.35   
 While the criteria have been criticised for being too vague, additions have 
been made to the Copenhagen criteria.  One of these changes was the inclusion of 
corruption, as it was seen relevant to the respect of the rule of law and the 
functioning of the market economy. Another change is the tightening of the 
requirement that the Copenhagen criteria must be met before accession takes place. 
The EU has moved away from a plain procedural condition of formal democracy, 
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according to Pridham. From just demanding the rule of law, separation of powers and 
free and fair elections, the EU now also demands the achievement of a substantive 
democracy. This includes the role of political parties as vehicles for political 
participation, the pluralism of the media, effective local government, and an involved 
civil society, as seen above.36 
  To show the progress Kosovo is making toward European integration, the 
European Commission reports regularly to the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament through a yearly Progress Report. There it analyses Kosovo’s domestic 
situation in terms of the political criteria and the economic criteria. More importantly it 
reviews Kosovo’s capacity to implement European standards.37 
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Part 1: Domestic challenges 
 
 
Kosovo has had a long transformation toward the domestic state system of 
parliamentary democracy it has today.38 More precisely, it can be described as a 
corrupt oligarchy, which has huge challenges in the process of democratization and 
in its aspiration toward EU membership. While all administration had been held by 
Serbia, this has now vanished from large parts of Kosovo. Serbia kept de facto 
control over Northern Kosovo. This entails that Kosovo has been left without the 
common characteristics of the social and economic bases for democracy.39  
 The democratic government is today reassured in the constitution,40 but the 
idea of liberal democracy entails more than just free and fair elections. The 
establishment of a functioning and stable liberal democracy is crucial for the securing 
of certain rights and aspects of what now is considered to be a part of the 
democratization process. Kosovo has challenges in this process, especially with 
regards to corruption, which is a direct obstacle to both democracy and economic 
development. Success in these areas is necessary for Kosovo’s progress toward 
international integration, Europeanization and eventually EU membership.  
 Parrot argues that the West European democracies have had a stronger 
impact upon the East European countries, than upon other states, due to the desire 
to become admitted to the European Union, and NATO.41 This is most certainly true 
when it comes to Kosovo, whose leaders say they are committed to Europeanization 
and eventually EU integration-, which are perceived as a solution to the present 
challenges.  
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 Kosovo is facing large challenges in its road toward EU integration and visa 
liberation, which is considered as highly important in Kosovo.42 Kosovo remains the 
only country in the South East Europe whose citizens are not able to travel visa- free 
to the EU.43 The progress Kosovo is making toward European integration is shown in 
The Progress Report; and its effort is in complying with the Copenhagen criteria and 
the conditionality of the Stabilisation and Association Process.44 The purpose behind 
the Progress Report issued by the European Commission is to develop and 
strengthen communication concerning the challenges aspiring members are facing, 
and to recommend measures that the governments should take in the view of 
accession to the EU. The EU has set criteria for membership, and standards for 
democratic values – which entail that Kosovo achieves success in certain problem 
areas, such as engagement in the civil society, economic development, corruption, 
organized crime and the programmatic correct pluralisation of politics.45    
 The Copenhagen criteria need to be fulfilled, and these will not be tackled in 
the near future. The problems Kosovo is facing today are deeply rooted in the state 
system. There are still challenges that need to be dealt with before Kosovo could be 
considered a liberal democracy. One major challenge is the widespread corruption 
which undermines the rule of law. Kosovo is still an unfinished state in many ways.46 
A number of Kosovo’s burning political and social problems have remained 
unresolved.47 In 2012, the EU declared that Kosovo was ready to start the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations after taking some measures 
regarding the rule of law, trade, public administration and protection of minorities. 
Kosovo and the EU started SAA negotiations in October 2013; this is scheduled to 
end by mid- 2014.48   
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2.0 Political situation in Kosovo 
During the period as an international protectorate (1999-2008) various roles were 
played by the international organizations deployed in Kosovo. This resulted in a 
complicated and awkward system of crossing responsibilities – and what Bebler 
describes as a legal limbo.49 While the critique has been on their actual achievement, 
Kurti argues that the problem was not that the international protectorate was trying to 
impose democracy in Kosovo, but rather that the institutional structures imposed was 
not democratic from the outset. He describes it as a doubly authoritarian structure; a 
top- down command with no internal democracy inside UNMIK or EULEX. The 
international protectorate had absolute domination over all Kosovo institutions; they 
could remove ministers and annul laws passed by the Assembly.50  
 Kosovo transferred some of its sovereignty to EULEX, which would monitor 
and supervise the newly independent state. This transfer was seen as an exchange 
for an independent state for the Kosovar Albanians. With the gradual devolution of 
powers, politicians of Kosovo have shaped politics regarding Kosovo. Günal 
suggests that Kosovo may be on the road to democratic stability. But the 
international protectorate situation involved restricted authority and autonomy of 
Kosovo’s political actors.51 According to Silander and Janzekovitz, oversight by 
different international organs complicates politics even today, including popular 
representation. The international organs have the authority to override political 
decisions and legislation that are in conflict with the UN roadmap for democracy – 
building and human rights protection.52 Still it is important to note that Kosovo has 
achieved significant changes since the end of the war. It has its own constitution, 
institutions and political structures; political parties participate freely in national and 
local elections.53 
	  18	  
 Kosovo has had four Presidents, although two have had to step down due to 
violations of the constitution. The current President in Kosovo is Atifete Jahjaga, who 
has been in power since 2011. Jahjaga is the first female head of state in any 
modern Western Balkan country.54 There has been criticism that the President of 
Kosovo has a largely ceremonial role. Jahjaga is a product of the political parties and 
a group of internationals. Her position reaffirms the international community’s power 
and authority in Kosovo, according to Besa Luzha, Professor Assistant at Prishtina 
University.55  
 Politics in Kosovo has been centred on international recognition rather than 
the more crucial domestic challenges of sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic 
development. Kurti argues that the focus has been on acquiring recognition as an 
independent state, rather than on actually being independent.56 The most important 
challenges in Kosovo are economic development, democratization, the weak civil 
society, corruption and the rule of law. To these one may add those concerning the 
issue of Northern Kosovo and the integration of the Serbs. Success in these areas is 
important for creating a domestically stable state, but also for encouraging the 
continuation of the international community’s vital economic and political support – 
which is needed for Kosovo to maintain its system.57  
 The political situation in Kosovo has affected citizens in terms of participation. 
As political institutions did not have enough authority to make important changes 
within Kosovo, many concluded that there was no point in voting. Citizens of Kosovo 
do not think they can influence the decision- making process.58 As the citizens feel 
excluded from policy-making, including as regards the policies and the economy, the 
Government coalition has lost credibility with the public, according to Kurti. Much of 
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the discontent is also connected to corruption, lack of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.59   
 The ethnic division, involving segregation between the Kosovar Albanians and 
Kosovar Serbs is still present, and is hindering both the rule of law and democratic 
consolidation in Kosovo. Kosovo is facing large domestic challenges in Northern 
Kosovo which remains outside government control.60 Northern Kosovo refuses to 
recognize and cooperate with Prishtina. Minority communities are guaranteed 
representation in the Parliament. The divisions of the 37 municipalities for local self- 
government are based on territories and not ethnic groups.61 As to political 
development, Pye argues that political development in general cannot advance far 
without a sense of deep identification with the total system. 62 This is especially the 
case in northern Kosovo where many Serbs identify with Serbia and refuse to 
recognize Kosovo’s state structure. This necessarily implies that the level of 
attachment to the Kosovo nation varies among the ethnic groups inside Kosovo.63 
Silander and Janzekovitz argue that until the ethnic and political divide between 
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is resolved, collective and popular representation will 
be minimal at best.64 
 While institutions are in place in Kosovo, the domestic challenges in Northern 
Kosovo, and the problems related to rule of law, corruption, and economic 
development require political will and concrete strategies that are implemented. 
Kosovo has shown significant progress in building the institutions that it has today, 
but the path toward EU integration will be even more challenging.65 Despite the 
constitution’s description of Kosovo as a democratic republic, I would say that it is a 
corrupt plural system, with no accountability for the politicians. Democracy in Kosovo 
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only means that citizens have the freedom to vote. Today the political situation in 
Kosovo is an obstacle for the development of a liberal democracy.66  
 The concept of liberal democracy was imported into Kosovo, and has not 
come naturally as in many other countries.67 There has been a lack of priority of the 
development of democratic norms and values; this is affecting the fragmented 
political system in Kosovo today. The key figures in the political system are struggling 
to establish fundamental identity in terms of ideology and political vision, and the 
political system is considered to be fragile. It consists of a weak and poorly organized 
party system.68 To secure a better functioning system, civil society needs to be 
developed – in order to make politicians accountable and to secure a transparent 
state. Civil society is a safeguard for liberal democracy 69	  	  
 One of the obstacles Kosovo is facing with regards to developing an involved 
society is the lack of ability to have referenda. This prohibition is found in the Kosovar 
constitution, and is preventing the society from participation in the governing of the 
state, according to Besa Luzha.70 One challenge in Kosovo today is to make the 
citizens feel ownership of the state and rules; citizens need to believe they can 
influence the political situation. The constitution and the president are both imposed 
by the international community. This could change if the Kosovar Albanians were 
given something of their own, such as a constitution or a president – which are both 
now in place by the international community. Citizens in Kosovo need to feel that 
they can influence politics, and that its not just the international community that 
makes important decisions, according to Ardian Arifaj, a political commentator.71  
 In the political arena in Kosovo the most influential actors are the top party 
members, the top officials of the international organizations residing in Kosovo, the 
top Kosovo bureaucrats and the US Ambassador. Politics in Kosovo is strongly 
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connected to US politics, and it is vulnerable to influence from the leading EU 
members. Other than these, Kosovo’s political arena is also influenced by Serbia. 72  
Politicians in Kosovo are today under influence from the international community, and 
this leaves the politicians partly paralyzed in action. 73  
 
2.1 Political parties in Kosovo  
After the war numerous loosely formed political parties were created in Kosovo. Most 
of them had their origins in the national movement – and demanded independence 
for Kosovo, and were not based around any ideological basis besides this.74 This is 
still prevailing when it comes to the political parties, with a majority of them still 
lacking clear ideological base and programs.75 The central question has been the 
question of Kosovo’s independence, and which party has played the leading role in 
this process. This has affected the development of the politics in Kosovo, as there is 
a clear lack of difference amongst the parties in ideology and economic programs.76  
 Politics in Kosovo could be described as homogeneous.77 The conflict 
amongst the political parties is rarely related to social and economic policies. As 
there is no real separation between the political parties ideologically or in programs 
this means that there is no real choice in politics.78  The ideological basis has been, 
and remains, Albanian nationalism – with the issue of independence and recognition 
continuing to be the most central issue of focus. Societal and economic programs 
have come second. Few parties have actually demonstrated organizational 
cohesiveness or party policy direction.79 Günal argues that the lack of ideological 
perspective is a deliberate act, and labels them “catch- all parties”. This label entails 
that their goal is to maximise support from all sides. Politics in Kosovo is centred on 
the personal quest for power, positions and privileges, rather than competition over 
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policies and programs. Due to a lack of clear political programs, the voters’ 
preferences are influenced by the leaders’ charisma and regional affinity –rather than 
politics. This situation is evident in the frequent transfer of members from one party to 
another.80   
 The most influential political parties in Kosovo today are: The Democratic 
League of Kosovo, The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, The New Kosovo Alliance, 
and Self- Determination. Some minor parties also play important roles in the politics 
in terms of influencing the composition of governing coalitions and decisions, 
including ethnic minority parties. In Northern Kosovo the most influential parties are 
the Independent Party, the Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija, and Citizen’s 
Initiative Sprska. All the main Kosovar parties defend economic liberalism, an open 
market economy, privatization and low taxes. Similarly the majority of them stand for 
a form of social conservatism and state secularism. Social conservatism is 
predominant, with the exception of the New Kosovo Alliance, which does not 
espouse negative rhetoric against abortion or same-sex marriage. Despite some 
small differences, the major parties support EU integration and Europeanization.81 
There is almost no political spectrum in politics, all are situated within the centre- 
right of the European political spectrum. There is no substantive programmatic 
choice for the voters; hence politics in Kosovo could more precisely be described as 
superficial pluralism, according to Ramet and Simkus.82  
 Sörensen holds that the Albanian parties are strongly connected to traditional 
loyalty structures, such as clan alliances, in some cases with strong regional bases. 
This leads politics to be characterized by relationships based on loyalty and a duty to 
return favours. Thereby, some benefits flow from the promotion of politicians. 
Sörensen classifies the political parties as “authoritarian pyramids of power”. 83 The 
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government can create all kinds of posts to accommodate its supporters, due to the 
lack of a law on government.84 Kosovo today has the largest number of ministries in 
South Eastern Europe – this is a large financial cost and a challenge for the already 
struggling economy.85   
 With the achievement of independence, the leading politicians in Kosovo 
expected a magical effect, with great improvements, especially in the economic 
sphere. As noted above, the politicians in Kosovo continue to nurture unrealistic and 
exaggerated expectations about the effect of recognition, rather to focus on domestic 
development.86 Politics in Kosovo has in its frame of reference fixed upon the past – 
and has not looked to the future for development. The politicians have not been 
concerned about the implementation of policies of development. The evidence of this 
is found in the economy, which today suffers from existing policy; the lack of focus on 
the part of the politicians on development and actual programs has been associated 
with increases in unemployment in Kosovo.87  
 International recognition and Europeanization are the main priorities of the 
government in Kosovo. This has put other subjects at second place.88 Integration into 
the EU is the main concern, even if it entails a change in culture and values. This 
illustrates how acceptance from the international community and EU is of first priority 
for all in Kosovo.89 The mistake here is, according to Kurti, that while some other 
states are improving the rule of law, civic quality of life and institutional democracy, 
politicians in Kosovo act as if they believe that all of this will follow if the country gains 
EU membership. But it is these problems, which are hindering Kosovo’s European 
integration. More importantly, these problems are blocking the development of a 
liberal democracy inside Kosovo.90  
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 The political situation in Kosovo today is hindering the process of 
democratization, and the rule of law. Politicians in Kosovo are unusually corrupt. The 
close connection between politicians and organized crime is a major obstacle for 
successful democratization and economic development today.91 The lack of 
transparency together with corruption is hindering the democratization of institutions. 
The challenge Kosovo is facing is to make the institutions work for the people – 
instead of in the ruling group’s interest.92  
 Sörensen argues that the political parties in Kosovo cannot be considered 
democratic in the conventional literal sense, because of the lack of ideology and 
bridges to social groups in the society.93 Ramet and Simkus call this superficial 
pluralism. The lack of competing ideological programs and a wider spectrum of 
discussion in politics is discouraging the participation of the population.94 For liberal 
democracy to take root, there needs to be a greater level of political support from the 
population. A lack of support indicates that the political system does not work well. 
While most people in Kosovo support democracy, they do not agree on the 
democratic performance of the current regime.95 The current homogeneous situation 
also entails that people in Kosovo lack ideological perspective. This and corruption 
are the biggest political obstacles in Kosovo’s process of democratization.96 A 
differentiation of the local electorate and combating corruption are both important for 
Kosovo to develop a normal democratic system.97  
 
3.0 Challenges to the process of democratization  
As already seen, the development of democracy is hindered by the political situation 
in Kosovo, but Woodward identifies two other obstacles, viz. the national culture and 
the legacy of the Yugoslav system. The cultural argument is connected to the 
	   25	  
tradition of politics based on clan and family structures. This and the history of blood 
feuds are hindering Kosovo from moving forward as a liberal democracy. Woodward 
holds that Kosovo lacks in both economic and social bases for democracy to 
develop.98 
 The transformation which has taken place in Kosovo from the old system to 
“democracy” does not necessarily mean that it’s successful, as the political situation 
in Kosovo demonstrates; the system in Kosovo can rather be called a corrupt 
polycephalous oligarchy. In order for democracy to be consolidated – this entails 
stabilization and the effective functioning of the basic institutions of the new system. 
As noted, there has been a lack of priority of the development of democratic norms 
and values. There should be a process of adapting behaviour and attitudes that 
promotes liberal democracy. Most importantly, the democratic system should be 
accepted as the only game in town, if the politicians really want to bring Kosovo into 
the EU.99 This means that democratic practices should be the only accepted method 
of resolving political disagreement and making decisions. The arbitrary use of 
executive power and other non- democratic practices should be regulated to the 
margins of politics.100  
 Assurance of democracy in the constitution is not sufficient to guarantee 
democratic consolidation. The political culture of the population is important. One 
challenge Kosovo is facing in this regard is the lack of prior experience and the 
heritage of the old system. 
 The process of democratization and development of a liberal democracy is 
facing a challenge in relation to the old dynamic of ethnic separatism.101 The fact that 
Kosovar Serbs identify with Serbia is a hindrance for the promotion of democracy 
and for Kosovo’s state structure. The agreement signed with Serbia in 2013 could 
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further worsen the situation – with more sovereignty to the North and further 
separation. I believe that the focus should have been on integration instead of 
separation and more autonomy from Prishtina. This is a challenge to stabilization and 
effective functioning of the basic principles of the Kosovar system. In this way the 
process that has taken place after the declaration of independence has different 
levels of attachment within Kosovo, according to ethnic group.102 Kosovo’s challenge 
is to integrate the Serbian population, as there now is a clear separation. The focus 
should be on integration, and learning to live together, according to Beza Luzha.103  
 From the outset there were no EU or Western representatives in Northern 
Kosovo. According to Arifaj, this further complicates the situation, as Russia has had 
a great influence in the North. The Russians did not want Kosovo to join the EU, as it 
does not want that now.104 KFOR is present in Northern Kosovo in order to maintain 
freedom of movement and to try to limit violence between the different ethnic 
groups.105 Due to the failure to establish the rule of law in Northern Kosovo, the 
territory has become a haven for organized crime.106  
 An essential state function is to represent the people, and for the people to be 
involved in the political process. Popular representation requires that the state 
engage with and respond to the citizens’ needs and wants. Ethnically, Kosovo is a 
divided society. International presence is still necessary in Northern Kosovo to keep 
the peace. This situation reflects the serious societal and political division in Kosovo. 
While the Serb minority has reserved seats in the Kosovar Assembly, the 
participation rate has been low.107 In 2010, when the first elections after 
independence were held, almost all the Serbs in Northern Kosovo boycotted the 
elections.108 The Serbs in this region, with the largest enclave of Serbs in northern 
Mitrovica, have boycotted parliamentary and presidential elections in Kosovo, while 
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35-40% of Southern Serbs have participated.109 It is believed that the UN and EU do 
not do enough about the separation that exists and Serbian policy in the North.110 
 While the 2013 Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo is a positive step for 
the two states to establish cooperation, it has further divided society. A solution for 
North Kosovo, and integration into Kosovo are important for the proper functioning of 
Kosovo. The Serbs in the North resist any cooperation with the Kosovar government, 
and Serbian leaders in the North have stopped communication with the Kosovar 
government.111 A further provocation against the Serbian minority is the fact many of 
the signs in Kosovo are wrongly spelled in Serbian. They do have Serbian names on 
them, but the spelling mistakes are a problem. While many civil society organizations 
are trying to change this, it is still perceived as a provocation and does not encourage 
reconciliation and integration.112  
 While there are both laws to secure that there is no discrimination, and laws 
that provide for the integration of ethnic minorities in the society, many still refuse to 
participate. There is still a parallel situation in Kosovo. For example, Serbs do not 
need to learn Albanian in school.113 This is pointed out as an example of the further 
division of the Kosovo society, together with the fact that they do not go to the same 
schools. In small places they use the same building, but on shifts. The school 
curricula are also different, where both Albanian and Serbs textbooks present their 
own people as historic victims. This is a challenge for the future, and does not 
improve the situation for integration. This should change in order not to repeat 
history. The difference is, for example, that the Serbs view NATO’s involvement and 
also UNMIK’s as occupation, while the average Albanian sees it as liberation.114  
 For the Kosovar state to become consolidated the difference in support for key 
political institutions ought to be diminished. Due to the current situation where there 
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are large differences in attitudes between the Albanian and Serb population in 
Kosovo there are different views on how the polity works and how it should work.115 
Northern Kosovo does not use Kosovo’s state symbols or the flag on its official 
documents. With these actions the politicians in Northern Kosovo are violating the 
rule of law. Legal and political researcher, Dren Doli, believes that Kosovo made a 
mistake in signing the 2013 Agreement with Serbia.116 Northern Kosovo is now 
violating the constitution of Kosovo.117 Prishtina has failed in its attempt to implement 
basic rule of law and to assure safety for the people in the area.118 
 One of the problems often cited as an obstacle to both democratization and 
engagement in civil society in the case of Kosovo is the long domination of the clan 
system, where power has been held in a system based upon extended family and 
their leaders. While this system of patriarchal authority has gradually been 
consolidated, it is hindering the process of democratization, as it still dominates in 
both politics and society.119 According to Gusia, the patriarchal problem in Kosovo is 
easier to tackle than other challenges.120  Arifaj holds that the patriarchal system is 
now becoming a part of liberal democracy.121  This is what Feltes is arguing, that the 
system needs to adapt to the democratic change inside Kosovo, and that its 
domination is hindering both democratic consolidation and people’s engagement in 
civil society.122  
 Due to the lack of prior democratic experience, Kosovo is facing an obstacle in 
developing a proper liberal democracy, and in achieving democratic consolidation.123 
While democratic consolidation has become a possibility in Kosovo, Cocozzelli holds 
that this not a certainty.124   
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3.1 Kosovo’s civil society  
A functioning civil society is a crucial part of developing a liberal democracy, as it is 
considered both a precondition and a safeguard for liberal democracy.125 It provides 
a society with the foundation to facilitate the building of a liberal democracy that 
eventually contributes to peace and prosperity in the region.126 Many international 
reports hold the promotion and consolidation of Kosovo’s civil society as the solution 
to the problems in the country. Civil society has become a cornerstone of the strategy 
in democratization.127 The United Nations Development Program classifies a civil 
society to be “an arena of voluntary collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values distinct from family, state and profit- seeking institutions. It is a 
particular space in a society where people come together to debate, associate and 
seek to influence the broader society.”128  
 Silander and Janzekovitz have argued that the lack of historical traditions of 
popular engagement in democratic societal organizations or associations inside 
Kosovo is now evident in the lack of a clear civil society.129 There might not be clear 
historical traditions of popular engagement, but the establishment of the parallel 
system led to the first development of NGO’s in Kosovo.130  Kosovo’s civil society 
was at its height in the 1980-1990s when the goal was to resist the occupation and 
oppression by the Serbian state. The involvement at this time was done by the 
people and with an idea of a common identity, and what Luzha describes as “out of 
the solidarity of the Albanian population”.131 While this period is still described as an 
important experience for the civil society,132 the absence of clear traditions of civil 
society explains why Kosovo is facing challenges in establishing a functioning civil 
society now.133  
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 Parrot holds that the disadvantages associated with the lack of prior 
democratic experience are for the post- communist countries clearest in terms of the 
lack of human capital.134 The lack of involvement and interests in the different 
political positions and the political apparatus overall has hindered the evolution of an 
active civil society in Kosovo- and as we have seen - a lack of an ideological basis.135  
The lack of public engagement in Kosovo is attributed to the fact that the focus has 
often been on other areas, such as the economy,136 and the future as an 
independent state. The focus has been on narrow political agendas rather than on 
the overall domestic political situation. The lack of interest in influencing the political 
apparatus has, according to Silander and Janzekovitz, led the citizens of Kosovo to 
become politically disempowered.137 Due to the prevailing factor of nationalism, 
which has pointed toward independence and recognition, and which civil society 
engagement was first centred around – democratic reforms have not taken centre 
stage.138   
 Despite these negative views, Luzha describes civil society in Kosovo as 
active, both in political matters and in the promotion of liberal values. However, 
Luzha criticizes the international community for having forced the development of 
citizens’ participation in independent associations – and not just being driven by what 
in the 1980-1990s was described as out of the idea of a common identity and out of 
the solidarity to the Albanian population. Civil society today consists of NGO’s 
dealing with the reconstruction process, or cases such as EU integration, the 
development of EU standards, or Think- Tank NGO’s, the latter being in opposition to 
the government. Civil society is characterized as being donor driven by the 
international community – and specialized in certain areas. Hence the international 
community imposes civil society and their area of focus.139  
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 Alban Bokshi and Besa Luzha hold that the involvements are based on donor 
support- and therefore are closely connected to international interests, and that the 
NGO’s often act as they are told to act.140 The development of the donor situation in 
the civil society comes from the difficulty of surviving as a NGO without funding from 
these international benefactors.141  This donor situation is making Kosovo’s civil 
society weak. The democratic process still lacks the foundation that is needed to 
form an active independent civil society.142 Involvement in civil society is often used 
as a springboard into politics, and therefore threatens the idea of real engagement. 
Engagement in civil society is used as a starting point to get into politics. Young 
people create a name through civil society to then go into political parties. Many civil 
society organizations could be labelled more precisely as business civil society 
organizations.143 Mostly, however, the civil society organizations are held to be 
politically neutral,144 while it was also claimed by Feltes that some organizations are 
actually economically connected to specific political parties.145   
 According to legal expert Alban Bokshi, this is not the biggest concern – as 
there are great differences in opinion and between organizations. The real threat he 
believes is the funding situation, which creates a lack of space for genuine civil 
society organizations in Kosovo; economically they are therefore connected to 
certain agendas or values. Today the situation is that civil society in Kosovo is in 
many ways not a model in itself for the values and cases the NGO’s are promoting – 
this is however what they should be. Bokshi argues that Kosovo needs a 
development and change for it to be called a real civil society.146     
 While the number of NGO’s is big, politician Albin Kurti complains about real 
engagement and activeness.147 New types of civil society organizations are now 
focused toward influencing politics,148 with pressure for transparency from the 
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government and with the promotion of requirements of qualified people into 
governmental institutions.149   Cooperation between civil society and the government 
is a positive development, as the NGO’s then can have a better chance to influence 
the actual decision- making, and making sure that the politicians enforce the 
implementations. The problem has been that the civil society in Kosovo has 
remained rhetorical, with few actual changes despite the public critique of the 
government’s actions.150  
 This view is supported in the Progress Report, which holds that “even when 
public consultations on draft legislations take place, follow- up is often 
unsatisfactory.”151 According to the Progress Report, there needs to be an 
improvement of the level of cooperation, as an assurance of transparency and public 
consultation.152 In line with what the Progress Report holds, Civikos holds that, while 
the government has implemented many of the issues pointed at by NGO’s, the 
problem lies in transparency and the actual enforcement. However, the development 
toward cooperation between civil society and government will take time, as Idrizi 
points out.153  
 The Progress Report holds that there can be an improvement through a 
Strategy and Action Plan of Cooperation with Civil Society of 2013-2017.154  In this 
way, the government is in some ways forced to improve the situation, not simply 
because of the implemented Action Plan – but also due to the EU’s focus on this 
problem in the Progress Report.155  There is a requirement in the Progress Report 
that holds that “the central and local authorities need to improve cooperation with civil 
society, notably as regards defining and executing public policies.” 156 
 With the involvement from the European community the Progress Report 
shows some improvements in the current situation. A task force on European 
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integration and the European Council on European integration have involved 
representatives of the local civil society in Kosovo.157 Another challenge for Kosovo is 
the involvement of the smaller minorities in Kosovo, a action plan for the strategy for 
the integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities was reviewed in 2013158  
– but together with the Action Plan for Civil Society the problem does not consist in 
making the government implement these plans, but in getting them enforced and 
carried out. The challenges Kosovo is facing in civil society are essential for tackling 
the development of democratic life.159 
 
4.0 Economic situation in Kosovo  
Kosovo’s economic situation is important for its future political status on the 
international scene, and for EU integration.160 A liberal democracy also entails a 
functioning economy – so the economic situation is an important component in the 
development of such. It is suggested that advances in economic growth produce 
advantages in developing democracy.161 In Kosovo today, the economic situation is a 
major challenge for progress and the ability to move forward and secure future 
economic development.162 The European Commission’s approach to the economic 
criteria for membership is guided by the Copenhagen criteria. It is essential that 
Kosovo fulfil these criteria in order to be accepted as a member of the EU. The 
criteria demand the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.163  
 For Kosovo, EU integration is connected to economic development and an 
improvement of the current situation; today the economic situation is a clear obstacle 
for membership.164 The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) was set up 
by the European Union exclusively for the Western Balkan countries in order to 
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address their European prospects and potential. The main objective is to further 
economic cooperation between the EU and the Yugoslav successor states by 
establishing a free trade zone and supporting stabilization within the given countries. 
The SAA could have great impact for economic development in Kosovo. The 
agreement is expected to be drafted by mid- 2014.165 As there are members of the 
EU that do not recognize Kosovo, the EU as a legal entity will sign the SAA. The SAA 
does not mean that the EU or any particular member state recognizes Kosovo as an 
independent state.166  
 Kosovo has been an underdeveloped agricultural economy, 167 which, as a 
part of Yugoslavia, was the poorest and most backward region. Kosovo had the 
highest rates of unemployment, illiteracy, and, lowest levels of educational 
attainment, the least infrastructure, and the highest birth rates. During the war of 
1998-1999 most of Kosovo’s industry was destroyed.168  After the involvement of the 
international community the situation changed. The challenge lies in Kosovo’s 
uncertain political status. This has made Kosovo unable to access international 
financial institutions and attract foreign capital from the outset of independence.169 
This situation has severely limited the process of economic recovery. Today Kosovo 
is a member of several international organizations and free trade agreements, 
despite the unresolved issue of diplomatic recognition: the IMF, the World Bank, the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement and now, recently, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. The prospects of the SAA are also promising in 
terms of economic development.  
 Despite the partial admission into international financial institutions, the 
economic situation inside Kosovo remains fragile; the problem is that it started from a 
low baseline of economic development. The economic situation today is connected to 
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Kosovo’s history: the period inside the SFRY, the political and economic isolation 
during the Milošević years (1987-2000), the tension between the Serb and Albanian 
populations, and the unresolved issue of Kosovo’s status.170  
 The biggest challenges Kosovo is facing in economic terms today are the lack 
of economic development, unemployment and the trade deficit rate. While the growth 
rate is the highest one in the region, the Progress Report holds that this rate is 
fragile, and unsustainable over the long term.171 The rate is largely attributed to 
investment in reconstruction, donor assistance and remittance, these investments 
and the increasing private sector activities will become critical to generate growth in 
the future- especially in terms of improving the employment rate.172 Despite the high 
growth rate, the economy in Kosovo is experiencing a negative trend due to the trade 
deficit rate and corruption. Economic governance has to be improved to tackle the 
situation – both for progress in the international community and domestically to meet 
the needs of the citizens. While policy makers have not had their main focus on 
sustainable economic development, they are now under heavy pressure, as the 
situation needs to change.173 The focus has been on enriching themselves, and on 
narrow political agendas of diplomatic recognition. They also need to deal with the 
black market economy that exists today – as this limits remittance to government for 
economic, welfare and social reforms.174   
 Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe, with a per capita GDP of 
about €2,800 in 2012. This makes the per capita income on the average about one – 
tenth of EU levels. The incidence of poverty remains high, and extreme poverty is 
high among ethnic minority households, the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian 
communities.175 Despite the negative statistics, poverty is not an obvious problem – 
due to the solidarity of social networks. Due to this informal support, poverty is not as 
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extreme, as it might be without such; and the idea of helping the community still 
stands strong in Kosovo.176 Kosovo’s ranking as one of the poorest countries in 
Europe is connected to its high unemployment and extensive corruption. Kosovo has 
one of the weakest employment records in Europe, with a rate of above 25.6% in 
2012. For Kosovo’s economic situation to change, and to improve the economy, the 
unemployment rate needs to be reduced. The reduction of this rate is an important 
component of economic development in Kosovo.177  
 The Progress Report holds the general economic situation to be challenging 
due to unemployment. The same report holds that there is a mismatch between the 
skills needed in the labour market and those provided by the education system, and 
that the information about the labour market is scarce and patchy.178 
Demographically Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe. The labour market 
has been especially serious for the younger population and women.179 
 Besides the high unemployment rate, the other economic challenge Kosovo is 
facing is the high trade deficit, which stands at 35.1% of GDP.180 The current 
situation is that the trade deficit rate is a negative contributor to economic growth. 
Kosovo’s exports have declined gradually, and the trade imbalance remains 
significant. Kosovo’s economic situation would not change dramatically with a growth 
in export, according to the World Bank.181 This is because of the high level of imports 
– which has further deepened the trade deficit. The increase in the trade deficit rate 
is a result of the growth in imports.182 Due to the high level of imports there is a trade 
imbalance, with a low coverage rate. These trade indicators demonstrate the 
challenge Kosovo is facing with the poor economic situation.183 The trade deficit rate 
reflects the underdeveloped and a remaining narrow domestic production base.184 
The sector of food and live animals for example is considered to be underdeveloped 
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and unable to compete on the international market. More reforms are needed from 
the government to transform this situation, and to improve the economic situation.185 
 It is believed that, with the signing of the SAA, Kosovo will gradually 
experience a growth in exports, which in turn will slow the pace of the increasing 
trade deficit and will increase the coverage ratio. The EU plays an important role in 
Kosovo’s challenges in the economic situation- especially in trade activities in terms 
of regional distribution.186  
  
4.1 Barriers to economic development 
Kosovo’s government faces the challenge of generating new sources of economic 
growth to improve the current situation- but also to improve the current climate inside 
of Kosovo. Due to barriers such as corruption, organized crime, and deficiencies in 
the rule of law, there are barriers domestically in terms of economic growth. This is a 
direct obstacle for the development of the private sector in Kosovo today.187 Corrupt 
practices impede economic growth by creating direct barriers to open markets and 
hampering the relationship between the taxpayer and the state. The presence of 
corruption in government contracts remains the biggest threat to the business 
environment in Kosovo.188 I believe that Kosovo will need to continue to focus its 
efforts on the strengthening of the rule of law to improve its economic growth outlook. 
Some progress has been made in regard to the improvement of the rule of law and in 
the business climate according to the World Bank.189  
 Privatization has been a cornerstone in contemporary aid thinking, and has 
been seen as essential for Kosovo’s economic transformation; the idea has been that 
the creation of a private sector will generate economic development, employment 
and attract foreign direct investment. The first obstacle was the dispute of the 
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process of the determination of ownership by Kosovo and Serbia. This halted the 
process- Serbia called Kosovo’s privatization a robbery of the Serbian state and 
people.190 The second barrier is that privatization in Kosovo is in reality not attracting 
FDI at the expected level. This process consists of corrupt practices, and is not 
creating employment. Most of the FDI goes to the banking sector, and construction; 
Kurti argues that these investments serve the purpose of money laundering. It is a 
challenge to make the privatization process benefit the economy; publically owned 
enterprises are being sold off, and, while the losses of these sales are absorbed by 
the state budget, the gains go into the pockets of private individuals. Politicians have 
been pocketing the gains themselves. The lack of transparency in government and in 
the privatization process is weakening the rule of law in Kosovo. The way the 
privatization process has been conducted is in itself an obstacle to the rule of law and 
the lack of laws on privatization is a barrier to economic development.191   
 As most of the political parties are politically conservative, they seek to further 
privatize.192 To overcome this barrier and secure the benefits there should be a 
system that looks at what would actually benefit the state economically – i.e., what 
would create more sources for development.193 Today the public healthcare system 
for example is struggling while the private sector is benefitting from the situation. The 
privatization process has been wracked by corruption, and the politicians of Kosovo 
are gaining more than the state due to the policy system on privatization today and 
lack of transparency.194  
 In the Progress Report issued by the European Commission it is highlighted 
that government capital spending has remained focused on highway construction at 
the expense of other needy sectors.195 Not only was this a wrong priority, this is a 
process that is similar to the one of privatization; the construction of the highway to 
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Albania was arranged mainly for the politicians’ own gain. It is common knowledge 
that the politicians received kickbacks on this construction project. According to Besa 
Luzha, program coordinator for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the more urgent 
needs that should have been prioritized include water and energy supplies for the 
citizens of Kosovo, but investments in highways was prioritized instead. This is a 
great challenge in Kosovo, with corruption in this of area.196 
 
4.2 Negative implications of the economic situation 
One of the biggest challenges for gender equality, according to Linda Gusia, is the 
economic situation. This is especially in rural areas where the school drop-out rate is 
high among girls at an early stage – partly because the economic situation not 
allowing education for all children, and boys are given preference. The economic 
situation in Kosovo is an obstacle when it comes to gender and education.197  
 What might be an even bigger threat to the development of Kosovo, both for 
EU integration and for liberal democratic values is that the economic situation is 
contributing to the radicalisation of Kosovar Muslims.198 Local Muslims are 
increasingly rejecting everything to do with the west.199  The religious situation inside 
Kosovo is changing, and it is attributed to the weak economy, according to Valdete 
Idrizi, the executive director of CiviKos Prishtina. Kosovar Albanians receive money 
from the Islamic world to become dedicated Muslims,200 or get scholarships to go to 
Muslim countries to study. The many scholarships offered by Muslim countries are 
more accessible than those of the west.201 With the economic challenges people are 
facing in Kosovo, religion brings meaning to life. Partly this is a problem due to the 
economic situation, the other one being the isolation people are experiencing due to 
the lack of visa liberation.202  
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4.3 Economic progress toward EU  
The Progress Report concludes that the determination in Kosovo to pursue market- 
oriented policies has been maintained and that reforms have accelerated in certain 
areas.203 Economic integration with the EU is held by the report to be significant, 
which is a promising outlook – the EU is the biggest investor in Kosovo.204 Despite 
the furthering of economic integration with the EU, companies are not in a position to 
compete successfully in local and international markets. As a part of the Copenhagen 
criteria a potential member state has to be able to cope with the competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union. Domestically produced goods are supplied 
neither in the quantity nor in the quality that would make them successful in foreign 
markets. This is reflected in the high trade deficit rate.205  
 Economic progress is important for Kosovo’s development. Kosovo’s biggest 
challenge is to transform its advantages of human resources and natural resources 
into long term and sustainable development.206 Kurti argues that the government 
needs to focus on manufacturing to generate economic growth.207 The weak rule of 
law, the large informal economy and the underdeveloped framework are hampering 
Kosovo’s economy.208 
 The provisions of the SAA are considered positive for Kosovo’s eventual 
economic improvement. This is only in regards to the non- trade barriers such as 
enterprise reconstruction and social programs. The implications for the trade deficit 
rate and employment are negative. The increase in imports and exports will only be 
in a short or medium term. The trade deficit could deepen further if the economic 
conditions in Kosovo do not improve. According to Erëza Pula the SAA will not affect 
employment significantly, and might have a negative effect on many spheres of the 
economy.209  
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 The situation today is that the trade deficit and the unemployment are negative 
contributors to economic growth – this is happening despite a positive trend in growth 
rates and the positive balance of payments. Exports have not reached the sufficient 
level to transform the economy, and the current growth rate is held to be 
unsustainable over the long term, which became evident in the decline in 2012.  The 
steps taken by the government are not sufficient to generate employment or to tackle 
the current account deficit rate.210 The lack of official government statistics in 
employment trends illustrates the lack of focus and attention by policy makers in 
Kosovo on this challenge. The solution is perhaps a shift in policy to tackle an 
increase in employment and economic growth.211  The economic development lacks 
a stable economic base, and more importantly it is argued that the critical factors will 
not be resolved until Kosovo’s status as a sovereign state is recognized by Serbia 
and Russia. Silander and Janzekovitz believe that investment and economic 
development would be boosted by a wider recognition of Kosovo.212 
 
5.0 Corruption  
Corruption and organized crime are a big obstacle for liberal democracy to develop in 
Kosovo, as they undermine the rule of law, and have been shown to have serious 
implications for democracies.213 Corruption and organized crime are a threat to the 
stability and to the sustainability of Kosovo’s institutions.214 Corruption undermines 
the legitimacy of the state and the rule of law, and may weaken a state’s ability to 
defend its system of values, especially where democratic consolidation has still not 
occurred, and where the rule of law is less secure. It can help to undermine the 
support of the regime –even if citizens might support the abstract concept of 
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democracy and the market economy, they have mistrust against the politicians and 
the state officials.  
 The fight against corruption and organized crime is a key requirement for EU 
progress. According to the World Bank, Kosovo’s present capacity to fight organized 
crime and corruption remains limited, with a potentially severe impact on the EU’s 
internal security. Furthermore the situation today is that corruption is an obstacle for 
a visa agreement with the EU.215 The struggle against corruption and organized 
crime is a major challenge to the improvement of the political, economic and social 
situation in the country.216  
 The law in Kosovo provides penalties for official corruption with an anti- 
corruption legislative framework. A new Anti- Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 
was adopted for 2013-2017. According to the 2013 Progress Report issued there are 
few cases referred to prosecution, and very few have resulted in filed indictments. 
Despite this, the Anti-corruption Agency is held to have sufficient capacity to perform 
its tasks.217 As in many other areas in Kosovo, the problem is that the laws in place 
are not implemented effectively. Periskopi believes that the existing anti- corruption 
laws should be adequate to prevent or combat corruption, but they are not being 
implemented.218 According to Kurti, the problem is that there is no prosecution of the 
biggest criminals; they are enforced only against the mid- level ones. This critique 
also includes the international community, as they have failed to act and prevent 
corruption at the highest level.219 The international protectorate tolerated corruption 
to ensure short- term stability in Kosovo. This still has implications for its ability to 
tackle this challenge today.220  
 Civil society organizations have repeatedly complained about the situation, 
and have accused the government of not taking the fight against corruption 
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seriously.221 When civil society or the media in Kosovo have gone public with 
corruption cases, the response from the international community has been advice 
“not to lynch political figures publically.”222  
 The widespread corruption of local political elites has led them to become the 
richest people in Kosovo.223 According to the Anti- Corruption Agency, nine 
government officials who have been in leadership positions since 2008 have shown 
marked differences in millions in their wealth over these four years. During their time 
in power, nine state leaders have become millionaires. Another 111 persons show a 
great-unjustified wealth, which is greatly disproportional with their annual 
revenues.224 It seems to be common knowledge that officials frequently engage in 
corruption practices, but due to the lack of transparency, judicial oversight, 
implementation of laws, and lack of law on privatization, these actions do not get 
punished.225 Today corruption is routine and standard – greed has taken over the 
political environment in Kosovo. Politicians benefit from being in power, and their 
relationship to businesses.226  
 While the international protectorate tolerated corruption, as Kurti holds, Dren 
Doli argues that the international presence has had a positive effect in terms of 
market- regulations; which has hindered what could be called low- level corruption.  
One example is that one cannot pay to get out of a speeding ticket.227 The police are 
also widely perceived as the most trusted rule of law institution in Kosovo.228 
 One of the problems in regards to fighting corruption and strengthening the 
rule of law is the lack of separation of powers in Kosovo. The government has too 
much power – which is a clear evidence of the lack of separation of power. The ruling 
party has too much, while the parliament has too little, according to Albin Kurti, a 
member of parliament.229 Corrupt practices are taking place in spite of the inclusion 
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of several acts of corruption in Kosovo’s criminal code. One of the biggest concerns 
in the Progress Report is the implementation of the legal and policy framework.  
Where false declarations and conflicts of interests are treated as administrative 
offences, they should rather be treated as criminal offences. There is a clear lack of 
prevention of conflict of interest, where Kosovo has not followed up on advice from 
the EU.230 
 
5.1 Organized Crime 
Organized crime remains a serous concern in Kosovo, and there is not any concrete 
evidence of a fight against it. Kosovo remains a place of origin and transit for victims 
of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation and begging. There is an increase 
in the number of under- age victims. Kosovo is also a transit and storage region 
primarily for heroin, involving local organized crime groups, and for trafficking of 
cannabis from plantations in Albania.231 The Albanian mafia maintains control of 
smuggling routes through Kosovo, leading to Europe. Organized crime is continuing 
to be the most profitable branch of the economy in Kosovo,232 and the fight against it 
still lacks clear results. The government in Kosovo has adopted a new strategy and 
action plan against organized crime, narcotics, and terrorism and against human 
trafficking. Still the rate of conviction remains low.233   
 The Progress Report holds that there needs to be an implementation of the 
policy and legislative framework set in place effectively to further prevent these 
crimes – one of the demands is further cooperation with the civil society in Kosovo. 
The current situation needs to be controlled, especially through border controls with 
seizure of narcotics. Furthermore, there needs to be a more effective response to 
witness intimidation, which is a high concern when it comes to organized crime. The 
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Report holds that considerations related to the status of Kosovo continue to influence 
international cooperation in the fight against organized crime.234 
 
6.0 Human rights 
Protection of human rights is an important prerequisite for EU integration, and for the 
establishment of a liberal democracy. As set out in the introduction, the liberal project 
embraces individual rights, tolerance of difference in religion, life styles and culture, 
respect for the harm principle, equality, the rule of law, and neutrality of the state in 
matters of religion.235 Liberal democracy entails certain liberties, which are at the 
core of human dignity and autonomy in civil terms.236 Kosovo’s progress toward 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria also entails the requirement of human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities. 237 Kosovo is not a signatory to any human 
rights treaties or instruments due to its unresolved status. However, the constitution 
lists international human rights instruments, which are directly applicable in Kosovo 
and form an integral part of Kosovo’s legal framework. Due to the lack of 
membership however, its reporting remains ad hoc.238 
 With the EU brokered agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, there is now a 
big opportunity to improve human rights protection. The lack of cooperation between 
Belgrade and Prishtina has hindered the prosecution of persons accountable for 
international crimes and violations of human rights – such as restriction of freedom of 
movement.239 Kosovo has had some progress in this regard on its own, with an 
established working group, which is set to deal with the past and with reconciliation; it 
is to address past human rights violations of international humanitarian law in 
Kosovo. However, there has been little real progress in this regard up to now. It is 
noted that there is a lack of political will, expertise and resources to address the issue 
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of missing persons in Kosovo. While the agreement with Serbia is positive, Kosovo is 
still at an early stage of investigating war crimes.240 For both Kosovo and Serbia it is 
essential to show that they are taking their human rights obligations seriously – to 
show their dedication toward EU integration. This includes working together for the 
accountability for war crime and post- war abuses. But more importantly, they need 
to improve their domestic human rights records in line with EU standards.241 
 According to the Human Rights report of 2012, the biggest problems are found 
in Northern Kosovo. Due to roadblocks established by Kosovar Serbs, there is a 
restriction of freedom of movement and movement of goods – which is a basic 
human right. 242 Human rights violations on the protection of minorities have come to 
challenge the international vision of ethnic peace and stability in Kosovo. The failure 
to promote minority protection and integration will most certainly continue to obstruct 
reconciliation and peaceful ethnic relations.243 There has been no progress on 
Serbian- language instruction within the Kosovar curriculum. Serbian is still not 
available as a second official language outside areas predominantly inhabited by 
Serbs. Students from the Serbian community, and a majority of Roma and Gorani 
students have been enrolled in schools administered by Serbia. Implementation of 
the strategy and action plan remains weak and inconsistent in regards to the 
integration of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities. Non- majority communities 
continue to face major challenges in Kosovo, especially in terms of returning and 
integrating into the society.244 
 While this shows that societal discrimination against minority communities is of 
serious concern, this group also includes persons with disabilities, and members of 
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community (LGBT), according the 2012 
Human Rights Report.245 The LGBT community in Kosovo faces major challenges 
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with discrimination, threats and violence. This has even happened to the extent that a 
political party has voiced hatred against the LGBT community directly through 
conventional and social media.246  Kosovo’s parliamentarians have called 
homosexuality a sickness.247  While legislation is broadly in line with international 
standards, Kosovo needs to focus on improvement of this situation. Violent incidents 
against the LGBT community need to be investigated and prosecuted according to 
the Progress Report.248  
 Gender issues in general are of concern, where domestic violence against 
women is a problem. While the law criminalises rape, it does not specifically address 
spousal rape. The 2012 Human Rights Report concluded that rape was significantly 
underreported due to the cultural stigma attached to victims and their families. 
Human rights problems in Kosovo also include corruption, trafficking of persons, 
which were dealt with previously in this thesis under the section of organized 
crime.249 Government funding of shelters of victims of domestic violence and 
trafficking is not sustainable. The Progress Report holds that the Assembly has yet 
not adopted legislation recognizing survivors of conflict- related sexual violence as 
civilian victims of war.250 Regarding this legislation there were problems in the 
Assembly, where some demanded that the status as raped needed to be checked 
before receiving the status as a civilian victim of war.251   
 According to the Progress Report, the assembly has adopted a law on 
protection against domestic violence, as well as one concerning gender equality. 
There are seats reserved for women in the government, with 33% - and this standard 
has been fulfilled.252 Still, women’s representation in public and private sectors 
remains low.253     
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 The key challenge for Kosovo is to improve implementation of the existing 
legal framework and enforcement of decisions remedying human rights 
infringements.254 Human Rights Watch has demanded that Kosovo protect minorities 
and ensure the full guarantee of the rule of law.255 While the human rights treaties 
are reflected in the constitution, and the incorporation is set in motion, cases are still 
not being referred to the courts. Human rights are not a part of Kosovo’s culture.256 
According to the Progress Report, Kosovo needs to focus on the implementation of 
the priorities of the feasibility study. Implementing legislation on the protection of 
minorities and cultural rights remains an important challenge.257 While Kosovo has 
accepted the international conventions on human rights, and they are enshrined in 
the constitution, the implementation of those rules has been problematic.258  
 
7.0 Challenges threatening the establishment of liberal democracy 
As this part of the thesis has demonstrated, Kosovo has large challenges to 
overcome in order to achieve a liberal democracy and integration into the EU. While 
progress has been made in the external dimension, in terms of membership in 
financial organizations and the process of SAA negotiation, Kosovo still faces 
substantial challenges to its state building ambitions. These include the upholding of 
human rights, and the fight against corruption and organized crime. While it is clear 
that Kosovo has attained a certain stage of statehood in terms of bilateral 
relationships with other states, the current levels of corruption and crime are 
hindering the development of liberal democracy.  
  An essential state function in liberal democracy is the rule of law. As noted 
previously, the rule of law in Kosovo is considered to be weak. Kurti holds that there 
are three things “attacking the rule of law” and making the challenge to improve the 
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situation bigger. First, there is stability, which consists as mentioned above of the 
problems Kosovo is facing in regards to prosecution of the biggest criminals. Kurti 
holds that Kosovo needs a shift from short- time stability to sustainable development- 
from crisis management to democracy and justice. Kosovo needs to change the 
dialogue with the EU in order to change the present character of the EU presence in 
Kosovo. Kosovo needs to move from the current situation of peace, security, and 
stability to justice, democracy, and development. The second attack on the rule of 
law, according to Kurti, is the privatization process. He argues that there needs to be 
an implementation of laws on privatization, a legal framework that protects the real 
interest of the Kosovar state. The third obstacle is the governmental republic; Kosovo 
needs a separation of powers. Today the government has too much power while the 
parliament has too little.259 
 Politically there is a clear challenge to the establishment of a liberal 
democracy, given the current state of popular representation consisting of a political 
elite without accountability. The homogeneous political situation is thus hindering a 
proper democratic state, as there is no real choice between politics for citizens. The 
political situation today is hindering the development of a proper liberal democratic 
state. There are no clear sanctions for not following rules, only implications for EU 
membership. But an important part of the political problem is the fact that the 
politicians today labour under pressure from the international community. It is also 
held that the international community’s actions are more harming Kosovo’s progress 
than helping.  
 The process of democratization is by no means finished, there is still a lot 
lacking. While Kosovo has had phenomenal progress in some areas, this has not 
taken place in institutions, nor in the promotion of values.260 
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 The parallel system inside Kosovo, with the segregation of the Serb minority, 
is hindering Kosovo in being perceived as achieving a functioning democratic state in 
the eyes of the international community. Ethnic segregation is hindering the ability to 
provide security – which is considered an essential state function. The parallel 
system challenges the international vision of ethnic peace and stability in Kosovo. 
The division dominates Kosovo’s politics, and further hampers democratization and 
economic reforms.261   
 While there are laws integrating the Serb minority, both through non- 
discrimination and reserved seats in parliament, the Serbs refuse to participate in 
Kosovar society.262   The failure of ethnic integration will continue to obstruct 
reconciliation and peaceful ethnic relations.263 Control in Northern Kosovo is 
important for making the Kosovar state function well. Resistance from the Serbian 
leaders in the North has stopped all communication. The clear resistance and 
separation is weakening the principle of the rule of law. More importantly, as 
previously mentioned, Northern Kosovo is violating the Kosovo Constitution.  
 Kosovo still is lacking certain rights and being isolated from the western 
world.264 The isolation of Kosovo is leading to growth in fundamentalism. Kosovo has 
always been between the east and west. The religious situation has been that most 
of the population are not religiously Muslims, while they are religious and observant 
of religious holidays the population has been relatively comfortable to more secular 
and pluralist views of religion. Kosovo has prior partly been pluralistic, and generally 
tolerant to different visions of religiosity. Now this situation is changing, with a 
radicalisation of Muslims around Kosovo.  As Radical Islam Monitor In Southeast 
Europe holds; “a steady process of introducing radical Islamist politics in Kosovo is 
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being gradually backed by a variety of Middle Eastern interests that have managed 
over the years to recruit a substantial number of adherents.” 265  
 Kosovo has been a secular society; with the focus being on nationality rather 
than religious affiliation, this situation is now changing. The pace of Islamization of 
Kosovo has accelerated, and some Islamic leaders are lobbying for more political 
influence.266 Now due to rejection from the EU, more and more young people seek 
contact with the east. Turkey, for example, provides travel visas and scholarships. 
The Arabic world is more accessible in terms of scholarships than the west. Islam 
recruits young people in many ways, and such requirement is becoming more 
frequent. 267 Young people are more religious than the older generation.268  
 The rejection of the West that is taking place today is also connected to the 
economic situation inside Kosovo. People in Kosovo receive money and scholarships 
to convert to Islam, according to Arifaj.269 Scholarships and economic support from 
the Arabic world serve to encourage local Muslims to embrace a more conservative 
view on religion. Since the war, the Islamic community has had a grass roots 
approach to Kosovo, where the most vulnerable and hurt areas receive help. This 
has stimulated religiosity, and the actions have had a political agenda.270 Many 
Kosovar Albanians are fighting alongside Jihadists in Syria.271 Radical Islamists are 
trying to get a grip on Kosovo; this could harm the process toward both liberal 
democracy and EU integration.  
 The isolation Kosovo is experiencing due to the lack of VISA and the 
economic situation is strengthening the appeal of radical fundamentalism. As noted 
by RIMSE: “In essence, a territory in Europe which is being contested by the most 
extremist form of Sunni Islam will certainly find itself unable to integrate in both the 
EU and NATO.”272 Children in Kosovo do not remember the past, only the current 
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feeling of isolation and frustration. Due to Kosovo’s isolation, radical Islam is the 
biggest challenge Kosovo is facing in the process of EU integration and the 
establishment of a liberal democracy. According to Linda Gusia, there is reason to be 
afraid of radical Islam in Kosovo.  While Kosovo is dedicated toward EU integration 
and has always been western oriented, this situation can easily change.273  
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Part 2: External challenges 
 
 
As of February 2014 there were 109 states that had given recognition to Kosovo.274 A 
total of 19 countries had established embassies in Prishtina; this includes Croatia, 
The United Kingdom, Germany, The United States, and France.275 There are several 
obstacles for Kosovo in the international community, but the most stressing one is 
the lack of recognition from two of the most powerful states in the UN, and five EU 
members: Cyprus, Slovakia, Spain, Greece and Romania. China and Russia, which 
are members of the UN Security Council, have not recognized Kosovo’s 
independence.276  
 As part 1 illustrated, Kosovo has the institutions of a sovereign state, and has 
entered into the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU; but the 
disputed status ensures its suspension from many international organizations. 
Kosovo will not become a member of the UN before Russia lifts its veto, along with 
China. The probability for accession into the EU is limited by the five states that do 
not recognize its independence. 277 As the International Crisis Group reported in 
2010: “None of the five EU non-recognizers have shown signs of changing policy, so 
Brussels will be unable to take a position on Kosovo’s status. China and Russia 
would likewise continue to block Kosovo from UN membership, even if it were to 
achieve a majority in the General Assembly.” 278  
 The opposition against Kosovo’s statehood is hindering its participation on the 
international scene of sovereign states, and is creating an obstacle for domestic 
development. Domestically, non- recognition affects Kosovo’s economic 
development, which as shown in part 1, is a huge challenge for Kosovo’s further 
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domestic progress, also for the development of a liberal democracy. Externally, non- 
recognition on the part of Russia and China leaves Kosovo unable to join the UN. 
Serbia’s decision not to extend recognition to Kosovo has complicated the 
relationship between the Balkan states.279   
 According to Behar Xharra and Martin Wählisch, further recognition is crucial for 
Kosovo’s domestic development, with the non- recognition being an obstacle for 
economic development. One of the problems is that, due to the lack of diplomatic 
relations, domestic commerce documents are not recognized overseas. This leaves 
the Kosovar entrepreneurs without the ability to access markets.280 With the signing 
of the SAA in 2013, Kosovo will be able to liberalize its trade with all EU states.281  
 However, the large challenge Kosovo is facing in terms of its lack of economic 
development is the trade deficit and high unemployment. These two will not improve 
without the ability to increase the level of exports. Even with a trade agreement with 
the EU, Kosovo will still be unable to access markets across the world. Non- 
recognition is directly affecting the trade deficit. The other hindrance is the lack of 
visa liberation, which leaves unemployed Kosovar citizens with limited options. 
Kosovar Albanians can travel to only five countries visa- free: Turkey, Albania, 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Haiti. Xharra and Wählisch hold that Kosovo is listed as 
one of the most isolated countries in the world. Due to the lack of consensus dealing 
with Kosovo’s independence, the country does not have its own web IP address. 
According to Xharra and Wählisch this is posing a threat to internet banking, online 
purchases and national cyber security. Another obstacle for Kosovo, it the lack of its 
own postal code and telephone code. Today mobile phone calls are channelled 
expensively through Slovenia or Monaco.282  
 Kosovo is even unable to join international sports associations due to the lack of 
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UN membership, and recognition. The Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association’s (FIFA) official records hold that a member nation must be “recognized 
by the international community”. The Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA) requires that the country is a member of the UN.283 Despite this, FIFA 
announced in January 2013 that Kosovo was cleared to play non- competitive games 
with other nations.284  There are various strings attached to Kosovo’s participation: it 
cannot play against countries that constituted socialist Yugoslavia; there will be no 
anthems, no national symbols, and no flags. Kosovo’s first ever FIFA - sanctioned 
non- competitive game was played against Haiti in March 2014 in Mitrovica. Serbia 
and Russia still oppose any suggestion that FIFA should officially recognize 
Kosovo.285  
 This illustrates the problems that occur due to the lack of recognition, and the 
difficult political circumstances that surround Kosovo’s declaration of independence. 
Thus, Kosovo is experiencing isolation due to the lack of UN membership and 
recognition. The fact that Kosovo is only marginally accepted as a state in the eyes of 
the international community restricts both its development and its participation. As 
shown in part 1 of this thesis, politics in Kosovo has been focused on the issue of 
recognition rather than on more pressing challenges. Domestic development has 
been a second priority, with Kosovar politicians focusing on receiving recognition. 
However, there is no doubt the current situation has complicated Kosovo’s ability to 
move forward, and has many negative consequences for the country. Frances Trix 
argues that the lack of clarity on Kosovo’s final political status led to problems, 
especially in terms of the lack of rule of law, with which Kosovo is still struggling.286
 Russia, along with Serbia, has held Kosovo’s declaration of independence to be 
a breach of international law, and a violation of SC Resolution 1244(1999), which 
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established the UN mission in Kosovo. Russia claimed that Kosovo violated the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. Russia has argued that without a UN 
mandate, this act and the act of extending recognition are breaches of existing laws 
on recognition.287 The other counter- claim is that the recognition of Kosovo will 
trigger other secessionist movements across the world. Many of those opposed to 
Kosovo’s independence fear that their minority groups could apply the right of self-
determination.288  Due to the strong opposition against Kosovo’s declaration, the UN 
General Assembly requested that the International Court of Justice give an advisory 
opinion on the legality of the declaration, i.e., whether or not it was compatible with 
international law.289 The ICJ was to answer: “Is the unilateral declaration of 
independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in 
accordance with international law?”290  
 The ICJ did not find any violation of general international law,291 as it contains 
no applicable prohibition of a declaration of independence.292  According to the ICJ, 
Resolution 1244(1999) had to be understood as intended to address the crisis that 
had existed in Kosovo in 1999. 1244(1999) was established to develop “local 
institutions of self- government”, and to stabilize Kosovo.293 Despite the ICJ’s 
findings, Russia continues to reject Kosovo’s independence, as do other states. 
 Russia reaffirmed its position on Kosovo in 2012, when Russian Ambassador in 
Belgrade, Aleksandr Konuzin, held that Russia would support Serbia.294 According to 
Putin, Russia’s strong support of Serbia is rooted in the two states’ history and bond. 
With regards to Kosovo, Russia will remain Serbia’s ally.295 EU Commissioner Rehn 
claims that Russia’s policy toward Kosovo is based solely on its own interests, and 
that is why Russia has prevented a Security Council resolution that would mandate 
Kosovo’s independence.296  Sonja Biserko argues that the reason for Russia’s 
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rejection of Kosovo’s independence is that it seeks to prevent Serbia from joining 
NATO, and thereby prevent the Balkans from coming within the West sphere. Russia 
has an economic interest in the region, which it wants to strengthen.297 Russia’s 
interest is to keep Kosovo out of the EU. Even if Serbia recognized Kosovo, Russia 
will not, due to its own interests in the region.298 The fact that Russia recognized the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia in 2008 showed that 
Russia’s support for Serbia with regard to Kosovo was not based on principles of 
international law, but was rather a instrument to resist and take a stance against the 
U.S. and other supporters of Kosovo in the western world.299 In the view of many 
Western observers, the responsibility for the “diplomatic train wreck” Kosovo now lies 
squarely with Russia.300 Russia vetoed the resolution on Kosovo, and with this 
prevented Kosovo from becoming a United Nations member. 301  
  
8.0 Serbia 
Kosovo’s relationship to Serbia has been an obstacle to its ability to move forward 
and to become a full member of the sovereign states of the international community. 
Serbia’s continued opposition to Kosovo’s independence is hindering the country’s 
progress. The EU has made a solution of the dispute with Kosovo a condition for 
Serbia’s EU membership. Serbia needs to normalize its relationship with Prishtina. 
Hence, Serbia is pressured to give everything except a formal recognition in order to 
further negotiations over membership to the EU.302  The Constitution of the Republic 
of Serbia from 2006, proclaims Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.303 The 
constitution defined the hard- line Serbian position against Kosovo independence, 
and secures that future Serbian governments must follow the similar approach.304  
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 While many Serbs left or were expelled from Kosovo in 1999, according to a 
study by the European Stability Initiative, around two thirds of Serbs who lived in 
Kosovo prior to 1999 have remained in Kosovo. Most of these have moved to 
Northern Kosovo, or to other rural areas with a majority of Kosovo Serbs. There has 
been an unsustainable situation in Kosovo, due to the separation of the Kosovar 
Albanian and Kosovar Serb populations. Serbia has kept control in Northern Kosovo 
ever since 1999.305 This has allowed Serbia to claim its continued sovereignty over 
Kosovo. The situation has hindered Kosovo’s domestic development, and its 
progress internationally.  
   
8.1 Northern Kosovo 
Serbia has kept Northern Kosovo under its de facto control since the declaration of 
independence.306 Prishtina has not been able to exercise its authority, and EULEX 
has never been able to establish its authority beyond the river Ibar.307 Northern 
Kosovo functions autonomously within Kosovo, outside its administrative and political 
system, and is economically, socially, institutionally and politically more integrated 
with Serbia.308 Their actions in resisting Prishtina’s authority are, according to 
Kosovar Serbs, a visible evidence of Kosovo’s division and the collapse of the “multi- 
ethnic” society proclaimed by the UN.309 Serbs’ lives are isolated from the Kosovar 
society, and the Kosovar institutions.310 Prishtina’s lack of control has kept the option 
of partition open.311 Northern Kosovo has a majority of ethnic Serbs, and is 
contiguous with Serbia.312 “If Kosovo would ever to be formally partitioned, then the 
Ibar would be the border”.313  Both in Kosovo and Serbia the Kosovar Serbs are 
marked as a political marginal community, according to Florian Bieber.314  
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 Northern Kosovo has become one of the most complicated issues in the 
Western Balkans and South- eastern Europe; it creates distrust, disagreement and 
conflict. The issue of northern Kosovo could destabilize both Kosovo and Serbia, and 
affect the domestic situation in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.315 
Closing the issue of the North would help Kosovo to move forward with the state- 
building process, and rather focus on other challenges, such as democracy, 
economic development and the fight against corruption.316   
 
8.1.1 Southern Serbia 
Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Southern Serbia has gained an 
strategic importance for both Serbia and Kosovo. The Preševo Valley is a 
predominantly Albanian region, the inhabitants of which are unsatisfied with their 
position.317 Before the drawing of the borders after the Second World War, this area 
was considered a part of Kosovo. Therefore, Albanians often refer to the area as 
Eastern Kosovo.318 The region is considered unstable and the Albanian population is 
in a vulnerable position. Their position reflects Serbia’s political agenda, and attitude 
toward Kosovo.319 The instability of the Preševo Valley is a potential source of 
destabilization of Serbia, Kosovo and the wider region.320 The stability in the three 
regions in the South has been directly linked with the efforts to solve Kosovo’s status. 
Biserko argues that the problem in this region will not be solved until Southern Serbia 
gets consolidated as a state. This implies Serbian recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence. Preševo Valley has been a part of the Albanian question since the 
beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, and the Albanian population expected to be a part 
of the final settlement on Kosovo. But when Kosovo’s status was dealt with, the 
question of Southern Serbia became a sore spot.321  
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8.1.2 Partition 
As a final solution on the issue of Kosovo, and Northern Kosovo partition has been 
suggested. Kosovo would hence be divided along ethnic lines with Kosovar Serbs 
getting Northern Kosovo, and Kosovar Albanians getting the southern part of 
Serbia.322 Biserko argues that partition is a compromise between historical and ethnic 
rights, and hence the right of Serbian Albanians to unite with territories in which they 
constitute a majority.323     
 The failure to integrate Northern Kosovo into Kosovo is challenging the 
process of development in Kosovo. Kosovo needs a solution on the issue, for EU 
integration and for domestic improvements. The de facto division of the state is 
hindering democratization and the rule of law. The International Crisis Group held 
that the Athisaari Plan has so far “been insufficient to secure the North’s integration 
or Kosovo’s international recognition.”324 An agreement reached between Serbia and 
Kosovo in 2013 is intended to solve this issue, but its success is not certain. The ICG 
report sees a possibility of a territorial adjustment as a means to resolve the problem 
with Kosovo.325  
 The US has held that it will not tolerate any changes of Kosovo’s borders.326 
According to the US the issue of Kosovo will not be reopened.327 Accordingly the 
idea of partition is rejected by a majority of the EU members and the US.328 Serbian 
Prime Minister Ivica Dačić held in 2012 that partition of Kosovo was the only real 
solution to the problem.329 The EU cannot force Serbia to recognize Kosovo, as the 
Union does not recognize Kosovo either.  330  
 If Serbia is to continue to insist upon territorial autonomy for Northern Kosovo, 
it will have to prepare to grant the same to Southern Serbia according to Biserko.331 
According to Janjić, this kind of exchange of territories is unlikely as an option in the 
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current security and political circumstances.332 Hamilton calls partition an “imperfect 
solution”; however, it’s a solution that might improve stability, and security the region. 
Partition would allow both Serbs and Albanians to live with a degree of normality, i.e., 
live without contact with each other.333 	  
8.2 Normalization of relations    
The only common ground Serbia and Kosovo have is their European future. The 
unsatisfactory relationship between them has been a direct obstacle for membership. 
Serbia and Kosovo need to experience a normalization of relations to eliminate one 
obstacle for joining the EU.334  
 The EU has requested a normalized relation between Serbia and Kosovo 
without any clear definition of what this entails of their relationship. The absence of a 
common approach to the normalization process makes the situation more difficult, 
and creates confusion. But, it does mean a solution for Northern Kosovo. After the 
signing of the First Agreement, Kosovo received a starting point for SAA negotiations 
and Serbia a date for the start of EU membership talks. This indicated that the EU 
saw the relationship as normalized, at least sufficiently to give them the above. With 
this, the EU demonstrated that Kosovo’s way toward EU integration is closely linked 
to success in the normalization of relations with Serbia. This implies that internal 
criteria are a second priority. SAA negotiations would not have begun if Kosovo had 
just met the domestic short- term criteria set down by the EU.335  
  The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/298 initiated the EU- 
facilitated dialogue of normalization that started in 2011.336 From the outset it was a 
technical dialogue, as Prishtina did not want to enter into a political discussion with 
Belgrade on any internal issues. This dialogue resulted in different agreements, but 
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the most important one for Kosovo’s progress was its participation in regional 
organizations.337  While the ability to join in regional forums was a step forward for 
Kosovo, the agreement was severely criticised in Kosovo. Due to the terms of the 
agreement, it was seen as a direct step back for Kosovo’s progress, and caused 
public unrest. Kosovo has to be presented officially with a footnote holding: “This 
designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 
and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Deceleration of Independence”. Bajari argues 
that this footnote de facto undermines the constitution, and gives Serbia the right to a 
veto over Kosovo in international institutions. According to the former Foreign 
Minister, Skeder Hyseni, Kosovo can say farewell to EU membership if Serbia enters 
the Union first.338  
 While Kosovo by this agreement could participate in regional organizations, 
the full implementation of the agreement proved to be difficult. Despite the 
agreement, Serbia has refused to participate with Kosovar representatives present, 
and even left meetings in protest when Kosovars were in attendance. Due to the 
difficulty in upholding this agreement, one may entertain doubts on the more 
sensitive agreements reached on Northern Kosovo.339 
 In 2012, the dialogue evolved from a technical dialogue to a political one, 
reflecting that internal issues had been discussed from the outset; Northern Kosovo 
had always been part of the dialogue.340 The lack of transparency created fear and 
confusion. The Kosovar representative reported only once to the Committee, and 
agreements reached between Kosovo and Serbia were published only as press 
statements.341 Serbia’s lack of respect of prior agreements has provoked great 
distrust in Kosovo. The fear is that Kosovo will be left without advantages in the 
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agreements, without a UN seat, and under a continued blockade by the five EU 
countries.342   
   
8.2.1 First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of 
Relations 
On 19 April 2013, Kosovo and Serbia signed the “First Agreement of Principles 
Governing the Normalization of Relations”.343 Lydia Gall held that “The normalization 
agreement between Belgrade and Prishtina is a positive step toward peace and 
reconciliation in the region.”344 The First Agreement mainly relates to the status of 
Northern Kosovo, and could be described as “Ahtisaari plus”. The agreement 
establishes a framework for the solution for Northern Kosovo. The 15-article 
agreement provides for substantial autonomy for Kosovar Serbs, while it will be 
within Kosovo’s legal and political framework. The agreement holds that Kosovar 
laws will be applied in Northern Kosovo. This is first and foremost an agreement on 
power- sharing where Serbia has a continued role in protecting the interests of the 
Kosovo Serbs.345  
 If fully implemented this agreement has the potential to be historic – and to 
remove the main obstacle for Serbia and Kosovo on their path toward EU 
integration.346  According to Dušan Janjić the agreement could serve peace, security, 
and stability to the Balkan region. It is seen as a promotion of cooperation, 
integration, and advancement of EU integration progress.347 
 Today the agreement remains an outline, with much work ahead if it is to be 
implemented properly. The overall goal is to create a single region called Northern 
Kosovo, which special rights where it will function autonomously within the Kosovar 
state in many areas.348 The core of the agreement is that Serbia will de facto assent 
to Kosovo’s territorial integrity, in the exchange for a supra- municipal structure of 
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Kosovar Serbs. The first 6 points of the agreement address the establishment of an 
Association of the Serbian Municipalities (ASM).349 This foresees the right of the 
Kosovar Serb community to establish an association of their own, for “full overview of 
the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning.”350 
ASM will include the four municipalities of North Mitrovica, Leposavic, Zvecan and 
Zubin Potok.351  
 The agreement eliminates the separate institutions that have previously been 
linked to Belgrade.352 Serbia has the right to finance institutions of Serb 
municipalities, provided that it passes through Kosovo’s institutions in a transparent 
matter.353 Kosovar Serbs will abandon the idea of partition, they will in return be 
given the ability to exercise influence through the ASM. This agreement grants the 
Kosovar Serbs significant self- government; it can even be called full autonomy. ASM 
will have the function that it will diffuse the underlying territorial dispute, but it could 
have the negative effect of serving as a new source for political mobilisation of the 
Kosovar Serbs.354 
 The first agreement provides for the inclusion of the Northern municipalities 
into Kosovo’s legal system. Elections in the North will now be held under Kosovo law, 
and the institutions integrated into the Kosovo system.355 The second step will be to 
integrate Kosovar Serbs into Kosovar institutions. The process was to be set in 
motion after the municipal elections in November 2013; due to the establishment of 
ASM the participation of Serbs in this election is of great importance356  (only legal 
and legitimate municipal authorities may establish the ASM).357 The elections were to 
integrate the Northern municipalities under Kosovo law, and the local government 
system. The election was to be the first mutual recognition of institutional legitimacy 
between the central government and the Northern Kosovo municipalities.358 Kosovar 
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Serbs have received more executive powers in the area of police and judiciary, but it 
is to be integrated and operate within the legal framework of Kosovo. 359 Kosovo’s 
constitution has kept its position on the entire territory.360  
  
8.2.2 Ahtisaari Plus? 
The agreement is a compromise between Serbia and Kosovo, in which each has lost 
and gained something. Kosovo goes beyond the Ahtisaari Plan, the constitution of 
Kosovo and the Kosovo Assembly Resolutions. The Ahtisaari Plan was presented in 
Vienna as a painful compromise. The agreement reached in 2013 directly creates 
parallel structures with financial autonomy for Northern Kosovo. It is still not certain 
how this will work in practice, and what autonomy in the north will mean for Kosovo. 
Northern Kosovo will be treated differently from the rest of Kosovo, especially due to 
Northern Kosovo’s financial autonomy. The agreement goes beyond the Ahtisaari 
proposal, Article 8.2, and creates an illegal and unconstitutional situation. The 
agreement will create a further separation of the Kosovar society, with the autonomy 
given to Kosovar Serb. With the autonomous character of Northern Kosovo the 
separation could deepen, if the ASM refuses to cooperate with Prishtina as is 
intended. The gain for Kosovo is that this agreement implements Kosovar formal 
sovereignty over the entire territory, and thereby confirms its functionality and 
sovereignty.361  
 However, the agreement could complicate the domestic situation inside 
Kosovo, with Kosovar Serbs obtaining increased practical sovereignty. While western 
officials have emphasized that the solution will not be regional autonomy, as such 
could not be allowed under the constitution, it could lead to further separation. The 
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fear is that it will be a sort of partition of Kosovo, with a situation bearing a 
resemblance to that of Republika Srpska.362  
 The ASM might introduce dual governance in Kosovo, with a division along 
ethnic lines. While it is clear that Northern Kosovo needs a solution to secure stability 
and progress for Kosovo, the ASM is a major compromise for Serb integration.363  As 
Janjić holds, the issue of Northern Kosovo is about gaining control over the territory, 
where Kosovo and Serbia hold different positions on the solution. Serbia wants 
partition, and the First agreement could serve as a starting point for this. Kosovo 
seeks full implementation of control in Northern Kosovo.364  
 The progress of the implementation, and further agreements are crucial to 
secure an outcome that does not lead to partition. Further separation could become a 
threat to Kosovo’s functionality. The ASM could create further friction and separation, 
instead of promoting reconciliation and integration as intended by Prishtina. If 
Northern Kosovo maintains a separate polity, it could signify the desire for 
partition.365 The next agreement with Serbia could hinder the normal functioning of 
the Kosovar state, with negotiations continuing to compromise Kosovo’s internal 
functioning.366  There is a growing suspicion in Kosovo that Belgrade and the 
Kosovar Serbs are working together to prevent the consolidation of Kosovo’s 
statehood.367  
 The Ahtisaari Plan foresaw a multi- ethnic society, but a full implementation of 
the agreement will be the end of this concept; as Kosovar Serbs will control 
education, health, justice, law and order, and economic development in Northern 
Kosovo. If the ASM refuses to cooperate with Prishtina, it will create further 
separation, and will be a step toward realizing Serbia’s aspiration for a Serb entity 
within the state of Kosovo.368 Without cooperation, the progress that has been made 
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in normalizing relations could be reversed. Implementation will be difficult, and a final 
agreement between Kosovo and Serbia on the ASM has not been reached.369    
 
8.2.3 Municipal elections in Northern Kosovo  
The municipal elections in 2013, held under Kosovo law were a great test for the First 
Agreement and of EU’s capability to impose stability. The Agreement held that the 
”municipal elections shall be organized in the Northern municipalities in 2013 with the 
facilitation of the OSCE in accordance with Kosovo law and international 
standards”.370 Following the election, Northern Kosovo’s integration into Kosovo was 
supposed to begin.  The first round of elections was boycotted, as Kosovar Serbs did 
not want to acknowledge the state of Kosovo.371 Forceful intimidation of candidates 
and voters at the polling stations took place.372 Due to the boycott, the elections had 
to be repeated. During this period, Serbia promoted participation, and directly 
founded and promoted Citizens’ Initiative Srpska (CIS).373 The second round of the 
elections was successful, the CIS won nine out of ten Serb majority municipalities.374  
 Serbia encouraged Serbs to participate by fomenting patriotic sentiments with 
regards to Republic Srpska in Bosnia. The Serbian government’s interest was in 
getting a date for the EU negotiations; therefore, it promoted participation in the 
municipal elections.375 As the CIS won the elections, Belgrade now fully controls the 
municipalities in Northern Kosovo. This influence will only increase after the national 
election in 2014.  This could lead to a situation where the CIS takes all councillors in 
the ASM, without any opposition.376  
 It has been argued that Serbia’s involvement and promotion of the CIS is an 
assurance of the ASM remaining in Belgrade’s hands. Provocative statements from 
the Serbian Minister for Kosovo, Aleksander Vulin, only strengthened the doubts 
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concerning Serbia’s role in the ASM.377 Candidates who wanted integration into 
Kosovo were marginalized and disadvantaged by Serbia’s promotion of the CIS. 
Irregularities such as the arrest and assignation of the opposition among Serbian 
ranks and contenders in the Northern Kosovo have created fear and suggest 
significant challenges ahead.378  
 Through the indirect presence of Serbia in the ASM, Belgrade has obtained a 
legal political voice in Kosovo. Serbia’s role in the ASM could have negative 
consequences, and lead to disputes about its role. Serbia used the municipal 
elections in Northern Kosovo to show its acceptance and willingness of integration of 
the Serbian community into Kosovo, to the international community. Simultaneously, 
Serbia supported the CIS, which refuses integration, and which is fighting for 
Kosovo’s return into Serbia. Following the national election in 2014, and the 
establishment of the ASM, Serbia’s influence in Kosovo could increase. Whether 
Belgrade really wishes to normalize relations remains to be seen. For its engagement 
and promotion of the election, Serbia elicited international support, and formally 
fulfilled its obligations for starting the EU- integration negotiations. The government 
and the OSCE declared the elections to have been successful, and held that 
Prishtina had proven that its statehood was accepted by most of the Serbs living in 
Kosovo.379  
 
8.3 What now? 
Due to the agreement, Kosovo was able to start the SAA negotiations. However, the 
agreement puts the Albanian interest too much in the background. It could 
complicate the situation even more, and create further separation. A successful 
outcome of the agreement would be that Northern Kosovo slowly integrates into the 
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Kosovar system, due to the establishment of the ASM. The agreement has still not 
delivered results, in terms of clarifying the position of Kosovar Serbs in the Northern 
area. The ASM is being set up during 2014; it is intended to dissolve all parallel 
structures in Northern Kosovo.380   
 Today it is still not clear if this will be the outcome, and if it will facilitate an 
interethnic dialogue inside Kosovo. It could encourage renewed ethnic mobilization, 
with partition once more put on the table. Many Serbs refuse to accept the 
agreement, and it has still not made progress in implementation. Kosovo depends 
upon high- level political pressure to implement the agreement successfully, 
especially before the elections in 2014. With upcoming elections in both Serbia and 
Kosovo in 2014, radical rhetoric is likely to increase in volume.381 According to Agron 
Bajrami, one important consideration regarding the partition of Northern Kosovo that 
Serbia must keep in mind is that what is being sought for Serbs in Kosovo cannot be 
denied to Albanians in Southern Serbia.382   
 As implied by the name of the “First Agreement”, many others will follow. The 
second round of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia began in April 2014.383 
According to the authorities in Prishtina, the failure to implement the first agreement 
lies on Serbia. Judicial authorities were originally planned to be integrated into the 
Kosovar system by the end of 2013, but with the second round of talks taking place, 
this has still not happened.384  
 The scope of the aim of normalization of relations has now been significantly 
reduced. This perspective of a long- term negotiation process will have huge 
negative consequences for Kosovo, as it leads internal challenges to be a second 
priority. Kosovo’s domestic functionality should be given a higher priority than Serbia 
and Kosovo’s road toward the EU.385 The key objective of the dialogue is now for 
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Serbia and Kosovo to agree upon a solution for Northern Kosovo, which is 
satisfactory for the EU process of both.386   The process of normalization has now 
turned into a tool to aid Belgrade’s EU aspirations.387   
  
9.0 The European Union  
EU membership is seen as essential for Kosovo’s further domestic and international 
development. EU membership is believed to bring with it economic, political and 
security benefits, which are essential for Kosovo’s challenges. Kosovo has clear 
domestic challenges to deal with before accession might start, but the EU has its own 
interests; the fight against corruption is of high importance along with the 
enforcement of the rule of law. It is in the EU’s own interest to make Kosovo a 
success story and to secure a stable democratic state due to its geographical 
locations, as Judah notes.388 Due to Kosovo’s problem with corruption and organized 
crime, a worst-case scenario for the EU would be a free trade zone for organized 
crime, traffickers and terrorists, and a return of conflict.389  
 The EU’s main focus has been to encourage Serbia and Kosovo to focus on 
their European future; it has not sought to change the domestic situation inside 
Kosovo.390 Ahtisaari, Rohan, and Ischinger, who were the architects of Kosovo’s 
independence, purported that Kosovo essentially was a European problem. In 2009 
they wrote, “The EU has the primary responsibility to turn (Kosovo) into a “success 
story”. Regrettably the Union’s inability to agree upon a common policy has not only 
weakened its role on the international level, but also become a major obstacle to 
determined action in the country itself.” 391 They hold that the EU needs to develop a 
unified position, and Kosovo needs to be given a clear European perspective and 
help to meet the challenges.392  
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 Since 2012, there has been an intensification of the relationship between the 
EU and Kosovo, and there have been important developments of a practical nature, 
which increase Kosovo’s chances for accession into the Union.393 The process 
toward membership is set in motion; the triggering factor being the agreement with 
Serbia. The Commission and The High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy reported that Kosovo had met all short- term priorities set 
out in the feasibility study.394 The SAA is generally recognized as constituting the first 
formal step for these Balkan states toward EU membership.395  
 The SAA is an important milestone in Kosovo’s European integration process. 
While this is a step forward for Kosovo, there are still great domestic and external 
challenges for accession into the EU. Besides the obvious ones of the Copenhagen 
criteria, and the relationship to Serbia, there are states within the Union, which do not 
recognize Kosovo’s independence. These are obstacles Kosovo will need to deal 
with before it can integrate into the Union.396  
 
9.1 Stabilisation and Association Agreement  
In 2012, the European Commission declared Kosovo “largely ready” to start the SAA 
negotiations in the form of an EU- agreement, after taking some measures 
domestically, regarding the rule of law, public administration, the protection of 
minorities and trade.397  Kosovo was proclaimed ready to open the negotiations after 
the signing of the First Agreement; the European Commission held that Kosovo had 
addressed the aforementioned priorities.398 This once more confirmed that the 
external criterion is more important than the internal one. At least the short- term 
priorities were not sufficient on their own, signalling that the external criteria are more 
important than reform and implementation of the internal criteria. The “Commission 
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considers that Kosovo has engaged seriously and constructively in taking steps 
toward a visible and sustainable improvement of relations with Serbia.”399  
 As a consequence of Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain’s non- 
recognition, the EU itself still does not recognize Kosovo. All EU documents relating 
to Kosovo have a footnote regarding its status: “This designation is without prejudice 
to position on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo Declaration of Independence”.400 The lack of recognition did not constitute a 
legal barrier to the contract of the SAA, the Commission held: “From a legal point of 
view, the EU can conclude a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo, 
as per Articles 217 and 218 TFEU. A Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
between Kosovo and the EU can be concluded in a way that it respects the positions 
of Member States on the status of Kosovo.“401  
 The EU confirmed that the SAA did not constitute recognition of Kosovo, by 
the Union nor by individual member states.402 While none of the states took their 
political concerns to the point of vetoing the negotiations of SAA, they might take a 
firmer line when it comes to the ratification of the SAA. It is implied that the 
negotiations will be finished by spring 2014.403 
 The SAA agreement is an obligation that every potential candidate country 
needs to fulfil.404 The EU report from 2012 confirms that Kosovo needs to 
demonstrate both commitment and progress in several areas, such as the rule of law, 
the fight against organized crime, public administration, the protection of minorities, 
and trade.405 As part 1 clearly showed, Kosovo has large domestic challenges which 
need political commitment and a willingness to proceed with the implementation of 
policies. The obstacles Kosovo is facing needs to be overcome both for an EU future 
and to secure a liberal democracy. It is essential both for Kosovo’s domestic 
	   73	  
challenges and for EU membership that recommendations are implemented and 
enforced. As part 1 indicated, the implementation has not been the problem, but the 
challenge lies in actual change and enforcement of the laws in place. EU legislation 
and international standards should be implemented. Northern Kosovo is one of the 
more delicate problems, which still needs work and progress. Kosovo is obliged to 
protect minorities, and to promote a multi- ethnic society; i.e, Prishtina needs to 
create conditions for Kosovar Serbs to feel part of Kosovo’s future and conditions for 
the return of persons who wish to do so.406 
 Kosovo will need to establish a free trade area where the four main Union 
policies are guaranteed, with free movement of goods, services and capital. Kosovo 
will further need to align its national legislation with EU rules, and cooperate more 
with the EU in certain areas; such as education, social affairs, culture and 
environment.407 While these are clearly set out areas of cooperation, there is 
uncertaintly regarding the EU’s role in the implementation of the first agreement in 
Kosovo. This is especially the case in Northern Kosovo, where the EU’s commitment 
and active role are essential for a solution and to reach a level of success.408  
 
9.2 Copenhagen criteria 
The Copenhagen Summit in 1993 defined the general criteria for the integration of 
the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, which wanted to join the Union. In 
the Treaty of Maastricht one single admission procedure was established. The 
European Union’s fundamental principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law was thereon included by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on 1 May 1999. This treaty codifies 
the essence of the first Copenhagen criterion. Potential membership candidates 
	  74	  
should respect and fulfil these criteria to prove their capacity to take on the 
obligations of membership.409 As shown in the introduction of this thesis, these 
fundamental principles are also found in Article 49, which holds that “Any European 
State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting 
them may apply to become a member of the Union.”410 While Article 2 then holds that 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States 
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.”411 Democratic countries, which want to 
join the EU, should respect and fulfil these criteria to prove their capacity to take on 
the obligations of membership. 
 The political criteria include that Kosovo needs to achieve stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect 
for the protection of minorities. The economic criteria relate to the existence of a 
functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union. Potential members need to implement EU legislation. 
There is also an additional criterion for the Western Balkans, coming from the 1999 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the Stabilisation and Association 
Process, with a condition of regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations.412  
 Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is an EU requirement, 
as seen earlier in this thesis. The EU has stated that this is not a new criterion for 
membership; good neighbourly relations have always been a demand for potential 
members.413 While the SAA negotiations began after the signing of the First 
Agreement, there needs to be a further development of the relationship between 
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Kosovo and Serbia before accession can begin.  Still Kosovo needs to fulfil the key 
requirements, and deal with the challenges presented in part 1 of this paper. In spite 
of the accession process that has started, Kosovo has large challenges to overcome 
before it can achieve membership in the Union.  
  There has been a critical shift of preconditions that need to be fulfilled for EU 
integration. Especially the concern discussed above, the external criteria will become 
more important than the internal criteria. While they both are criteria for EU 
membership, it seems more likely that the EU will focus mostly on the external 
criteria in the case of Kosovo. It even seems like the EU is going to demand more 
than good neighbourliness and good regional relations. With the promise of 
European integration, Kosovo could be lured toward compromise and normalization 
of relations.414   
 Both the Council of Ministers and the European Council have to act 
unanimously when taking enlargement decisions. One state could stop the accession 
process, if it should believe that it might not be in its interest. The enlargement 
decisions are largely based on the Commission’s reports, and the recommendations 
made. However, with the non- recognizers, Kosovo faces an extra challenge to its 
accession process. Potential members will only be permitted membership when it is 
judged that their accession will have beneficial consequences for the whole EU.415  
 
9.2.1 Has Kosovo fulfilled the EU’s criteria’s? 
The European Commission issues a Progress Report yearly, which I have discussed 
in part 1. The purpose behind this is to develop and strengthen communication about 
the challenges Kosovo is facing, and recommend measures that the government 
should take in the view of accession to the EU. The government of Kosovo is 
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committed to EU membership, and has adopted laws to make accession into the EU 
a possibility. As shown in part 1, the problem for Kosovo is not the adoption of laws, 
but implementation and enforcement. 
 For EU membership, Kosovo will need to fulfil the Copenhagen political 
criteria, i.e., stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. It also monitors regional 
cooperation and good neighbourly relations. Already in 2009, democracy, respect for 
the rule of law, corruption, and the protection of minorities were set as priorities for 
Kosovo’s progress toward the EU.416  As part 1 illustrates these are still the main 
challenges Kosovo faces today in terms of the political criteria, and in its aspiration 
toward establishing a liberal democracy. As these are direct criteria, and 
requirements for EU accession, Kosovo will need to demonstrate actual willingness 
and improvement in these areas before it can join the Union. Kosovo seems to have 
experienced a democratic setback in its efforts to build strong and independent 
institutions of democratic governance. There are several issues of serious concern, 
which could harm Kosovo’s aspiration toward EU membership.  
 The 2013 Progress Report points to the Kiqina case, where the Assembly tried 
to adopt a decision interfering with the judicial process. In terms of administrative 
independence, Kosovo has made little progress since the EU reports began, 
especially in terms of financial and administrative independence. As clearly set out in 
part 1, corruption is hindering Kosovo’s progress in both democratization and 
economic development. The lack of transparency and accountability is an issue of 
high concern, according to the 2013 Progress Report.417  Corruption and political 
interference are hindering professionalism, and Kosovo will need to demonstrate 
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change in these areas. Overall, Kosovo will need to demonstrate actual change, and 
implementation of legislations in all areas.418  
 In Freedom House’s ranking, Kosovo has the worst indicators of judicial 
framework and independence, with a rate of 5.50 out of 7. Compared to other nations 
in transit, this shows the problems Kosovo is facing in this regard. It indicates that 
there is a low level of democratic progress.419 Kosovo is ranked with 6.0 in corruption 
according to the Freedom House index. Compared to the nations in transit, it has a 
higher number than the average. It has the fourth worst index of European countries, 
with only Russia, Belarus and Ukraine worse in score. This is a bad indicator for 
eventual EU accession, especially since Kosovo has not demonstrated any progress 
since 2004 in this index. Kosovo also has the lowest level of democratic process and 
in national democratic governance of all European nations in transit. Freedom House 
ranks Kosovo as a semi- consolidated Authoritarian regime.420  
 Both the Progress Report and Freedom House’s findings illustrate the 
challenge Kosovo is facing in regards to the rule of law, and especially in terms of 
corruption. The situation is of serious concern, according to the Progress Report. For 
Kosovo to be admitted into the EU, effective prevention of corruption at all levels of 
society needs to be given a higher priority. When Kosovo signed the SAA, the EU 
held that it had met the short- time criteria.421  I believe, in accordance with the 
section on Serbia, that these domestic criteria were not as important as the 
normalization of relations.  The EU’s main concern was the normalization of relations. 
The lack of domestic progress illustrates this statement. When it comes to actual 
accession into the Union, Kosovo will need to demonstrate concrete action in 
enforcing the Copenhagen criteria. The only concrete action Kosovo has taken is the 
implementation of a legal framework that is in accordance with the EU’s standards; it 
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has not demonstrated any actual enforcement or actions to improve the domestic 
situation. Kosovo will not be able to join the EU before changes are carried out, 
especially in fighting corruption. 
 Kosovo’s main challenges according to the commission’s report also include 
the situation in Northern Kosovo. The situation with a parallel structure has hampered 
the democratization process, and has been an obstacle to the consolidation of the 
rule of law.422 While this can possibly change with the First Agreement according to 
the 2013 Report, I believe that success is not certain. According to the Progress 
Report from 2013, the First agreement “represents a fundamental change in relations 
between the two sides.”423  Much now depends upon the agreement on the ASM, 
and the implementation of it. In the 2010 Progress Report a key priority was that 
Kosovo needed to be able to deliver public services to the whole of Kosovo.424 The 
EU is rather optimistic in its view, and claims that the sustainable improvements of 
relations to Serbia have already led to a number of irreversible changes on the 
ground.425  
 To join the EU, Kosovo will need to have full respect for human rights. Kosovo 
will need to continue to cooperate according to the ad hoc agreements, and report to 
the UN treaty bodies and the Council of Europe on human rights. During the period 
that the EU Reports have been issued, there has been limited progress with regards 
to the promotion and enforcement of human rights.426  The main challenges lie in the 
protection of civil and political rights.427 The Progress Report of 2013 holds that 
Kosovo’s key challenge in relations to human rights is to “improve implementation of 
the existing legal framework and enforcement of decisions remedying human rights 
infringements.”428 Kosovo’s challenges in the protection of human rights lie in the 
freedom of expression, protection of minorities, freedom of assembly and 
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association, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, women’s rights and gender 
equality, anti- discrimination, and in protection of the LGBT community.429  
 While much of Kosovo’s legislation on human rights is in line with international 
standards, Kosovo’s challenge is the implementation and improvement of the actual 
situation. For example there has a lack of investigation and prosecution of violent 
incidents against the LGBT community, and in the protection of minorities and 
cultural rights – which remains an important challenge. Kosovo remains reliant upon 
support from the international community in the area of protection of the Roma, 
Ashkali, and Egyptian communities.430  The difficulty Kosovo is facing in regards to 
the protection of human rights is a great challenge for the development of a liberal 
democracy – but is also a direct hindrance for EU accession. It is a key priority for 
European partnership to have full respect for human rights. To secure success, 
recommendations from international bodies should be implemented. 
 The other side of the Copenhagen Criteria relates to the economic situation. 
Membership in the Union requires the existence of a functioning market economy 
and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. As part 1 clearly showed, Kosovo does not for the time fulfil the EU’s criteria – 
and it will most likely not do so for some time. Corruption and lack of clear political 
willingness and action are obstacles in the area of economic development. The high 
level of corruption in this area and the high unemployment are directly hindering 
membership. While foreign direct investment (FDI) is held to be the solution by the 
Kosovar government, this will not happen with the high level of corruption. In 2012, 
FDI even declined to the lowest level since 2005, according the Progress Report 
from 2013. The weak rule of law and an underdeveloped policy framework have 
continued to hamper the economy.431 
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 For EU membership, Kosovo will need to demonstrate full compliance with EU 
standards. To estimate a time frame for this process is impossible, due to the many 
challenges and incalculable variables in play. Kosovo clearly does not satisfy the 
Copenhagen criteria. The Progress Report of 2011 describes Kosovo as far away 
from European standards.432 When Kosovo signed the SAA, despite not having dealt 
with all challenges, it signalled that it understood that it will not receive membership 
until actual change has taken place. For Kosovo to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria 
there needs more than a legal framework implemented, there needs to be a radical 
change in the society, rolling back corruption and strengthening democracy and the 
rule of law.  
 Kosovo has a complicated relationship with the EU, as the Kosovar state is 
committed to accession, but at the same time lacks the political will to act upon 
recommendations. As the indicators from the Freedom House show, Kosovo has 
large challenges in its aspiration for EU accession. Due to earlier mistakes committed 
by the EU in early admission of members, Kosovo will need to demonstrate full 
compliance with EU standards. Bulgaria and Romania waited 12 years after their 
application for membership, but still this is perceived as too rapid. By too rapid 
accession the EU experienced difficulty in intervening in a country’s internal politics 
once it has become a member.433 This means that Kosovo needs to demonstrate 
political acceptance and willingness along with enforcement of the recommendation 
to show progress in its aspiration to gain EU membership.  
   
9.2.2 Additional problems for Kosovo’s EU membership 
With the difficulties Kosovo is already facing in its accession process, there are other 
factors which could delay it even more. For the EU, the goal behind accepting new 
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members is to maximise its benefits as previously explained. Due to Kosovo’s 
domestic challenges and its small size, with few available resources, the benefits for 
the EU are marginal. Kosovo’s membership to the EU is unlikely without domestic 
improvement, due to the costs in terms of political tension, weak democracy and 
corruption. There are few benefits for the EU to accept Kosovo as a member to the 
Union. For membership Kosovo would need to maximise the perceived benefits, and 
minimise the cost, i.e., fight corruption.434    
 In terms of getting accepted as a member of the Union, the clearest external 
obstacle is the resistance of states within the EU, which have not recognized 
Kosovo’s independence: Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus. The five 
non- recognizers within the EU have prevented further advancement of Kosovo on 
the international scene, according to Arbër Vllahui.435 They have at least limited 
Kosovo’s position in the relationship with Serbia. The position of the non- recognizers 
within the EU has weakened Kosovo’s claim, and led to the lack of recognition from 
the EU as a legal entity. But the biggest obstacle is their ability to hinder Kosovo from 
joining the EU, if it by a miracle did fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. In order to be 
accepted into the EU, Kosovo needs full recognition and a consensus within the 
Union. This could then evolve into a situation where these five could block Kosovo’s 
membership.436  
 The issue of Northern Kosovo and Serbia could prevent membership, and 
create several challenges for Kosovo in the future. While the First agreement gave 
the framework for a solution, its implementation has not taken place successfully at 
this time. The prospect for success is also limited, as Northern Kosovo seems to 
reject cooperation with Prishtina. The normalization of relations is essential for EU 
membership, as the Union clearly does not want to import internal security problems. 
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While Kosovo was allowed to start the SAA, the agreement with Serbia has not yet 
achieved success or a common ground of Serbia and Kosovo. While Kosovo 
describes the agreement as a de facto recognition of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the whole of Kosovo, Serbia holds that no such recognition has taken 
place, and that it’s not an acceptance of Kosovo’s independence. Success in the 
North is essential of Kosovo’s road toward the EU. While Cyprus accessed to the 
Union at the same time when the authority of the government did not extend to the 
Turkish territory, the EU has made it clear that such a situation will not be permitted 
for Kosovo. Nugent holds that Northern Kosovo could stay an issue into a new 
generation of politicians. A solution might not be fully realisable until those currently 
in power are gone, due to their direct and bitter memories of the armed conflict- both 
governments have entrenched beliefs. While the EU has clearly had success in 
pressuring Serbia to sign an agreement, normalization of relations is not yet 
accomplished.437   
 Without the singing of the First agreement, Kosovo doubtfully would have 
received the SAA – this shows that its road into the EU is closely linked to Serbia. 
Periskopi argues that in the case of Kosovo and Serbia the EU seemingly has 
adopted additional criteria for integration- as it emphasizes the criteria of good 
neighbourliness and good regional relations more than it did in the case of Croatia- 
Serbia.438  It is further held that such a new criterion should not have been added, 
and Kosovo’s way into the EU should be negotiated separately from that of Serbia. 
To prevent further problems in for Kosovo’s road toward EU membership in the 
external criteria, the term of normalization should be defined, with a official time 
frame for this announced.439  
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9.3 Kosovo’s relationship to the EU 
Despite the lack of diplomatic recognition, Kosovo has started the SAA negotiations, 
it remains unclear if this agreement will be ratified by all of the Union members once 
it is finished. Non- recognition of Kosovo’s independence could prolong the 
accession process even more. More stressing for Kosovo’s citizens, if Serbia 
receives membership before Kosovo, it could block Kosovo from joining the EU. The 
EU has for now set aside Kosovo’s domestic challenges, and chosen to focus on the 
external one, and the normalization of relations with Serbia. But it is certain that the 
Copenhagen criteria will serve as the basis for Kosovo’s accession into the Union. 
Kosovo is the only state in the region, where the path toward EU membership is not 
based on a contractual agreement.440    
 EU has not fulfilled its promise to Kosovo, as it was led to believe that it would 
receive visa liberation for the technical dialogue with Serbia.441 Originally the 
requirements for the SAA and visa liberation overlapped with each other. This is an 
indicator of the challenge it’s facing in its aspiration to obtain membership and the 
difficulties, which lie ahead. While the domestic challenges were put aside for the 
SAA, it has not been put aside for the visa liberation.442 This situation also shows the 
incomplete EU policy on Kosovo. As Arbër Vllahiu argues; “it does not exist any clear 
vision of that Kosovo means to the EU, or what the EU means to Kosovo.” 443  
 Kosovo has been told that EU membership is at least a decade away, 
according to Assembly member, Albin Kurti.444 Taking into consideration the 
challenges of corruption and lack of economic development, and the absence of a 
clear EU position and lack of recognition, this could be an optimistic view. There is 
clearly a need for large changes, both in Kosovar institutions and in the society. This 
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has been the case for other states in the region. As an example, it took twelve years 
between the application from Bulgaria and Romania to their accession.445   
 
10.0 Conclusion 
I argue that for Kosovo to become fully a recognized member of the international 
community, and to enter the EU, the prerequisite is to develop a liberal democracy. 
This is clearly set as a criterion for potential EU candidates, and it is in Kosovo’s own 
best interest to function as a liberal democracy if it is going to be accepted into the 
international community. Kosovo has today no prospects of being admitted into the 
UN. Today there are 109 states that recognize Kosovo’s independence. As this 
thesis has shown, Kosovo’s disputed statehood is above all a political problem, and 
not a legal one. As Gary Wilson holds, Kosovo is in the unusual position of having 
been neither effectively accepted, nor rejected, by the international community at 
large.446  
 Kosovo’s domestic challenges are a direct obstacle for EU membership. The 
implementation of EU legislation has started. Some recommendations have been 
followed up upon as shown in part 1, but the EU demands actual enforcement and a 
willingness to change. The main challenges lie in the same areas as in the 
establishment of a liberal democracy, the rule of law, economic development, and 
stable political institutions. An additional challenge to Kosovo’s aspiration to gain EU 
membership is the lack of legal recognition from some of the members of the Union 
itself. However, it is clear that accession into the Union will not depend solely upon 
the EU; for membership in the EU, Kosovo will need to intensify its campaign against 
corruption and show progress on all the required criteria. It will take much time and 
effort for Kosovo to improve its record on the domestic aspects of EU requirement, 
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and not least, willingness for the politicians. So far, the requirements are not 
satisfied. To have any chance of achieving accession into the EU, above all, 
domestic change is needed. Kosovo is facing the challenge of becoming a state 
based on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. As Arbër 
Vllahui puts it “from a country with EU aspirations and the international determination 
for development, Kosovo has become in the last two years exactly what it did not 
want to be, the ‘black hole’ in the Balkans”.447 
 Kosovo is not a state based on democratic values, nor is it a system of 
parliamentary democracy despite the reassurance in the constitution. As Inglehart 
and Welzei note, “one cannot assume that making democracy work is simply a 
matter of having the right constitutional arrangements.”448 Corruption and the 
homogeneous political system are undermining the democratic system and the core 
foundation of a liberal democratic state. As noted in the introduction, it is not enough 
to be democratic, i.e., have free and fair elections. The political system needs to have 
a liberal character, which is defined by the rule of law, toleration, a commitment to 
equality, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and 
property.449 As Ramet argues, in line with Zakaria, elections are no guarantee of 
liberal democracy. She argues that elections held before the rule of law is 
established in a state, are a recipe for dysfunctionality, not for liberal democracy.450 
 Today Kosovo is better described as a corrupt polycephalous oligarchy. 
Democracy entails other crucial elements, such as multi-party elections – this has 
been realized only superficially in Kosovo where there is no real choice in politics. Di 
Palma holds that an important factor in a democracy is the existence of competitive 
parties, and a selection of alternative candidates.451 I would say that it is a corrupt 
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pluralist system, with no accountability for politicians. The lack of separation of 
powers is hindering the development of a stable democratic state.  
 Corruption is undermining all functions of the state, and is a threat to the 
stability and sustainability of Kosovar institutions. As Ramet points out, corruption 
does not only entail giving private gain priority over public interest in the decision- 
making of corrupt office- holders, but it also creates an organic bond between corrupt 
office- holders and organized crime. This bond, as she holds, severely compromises 
the efforts to consolidate the rule of law.452 Economic development will not take place 
until corruption is dealt with; this entails enforcement of the legal framework in place.  
To have a functioning democratic state, a certain degree of economic prosperity is 
necessary, according to Di Palma.453 Unemployment, poverty, and the trade deficit 
need to be prioritized if Kosovo is to move forward. According to the World Bank, 
corruption and bribery remain a key factor deterring companies from investing in 
Kosovo. Corruption is an obstacle to attracting investment, hence is a obstacle for 
economic development. The fight against corruption and organized crime is one of 
the key criteria for Kosovo’s further European integration.454 
 Other challenges are the protection of human rights, ethnic separation and the 
ongoing radicalisation of Kosovar Muslims. Kosovo’s key challenges are to 
implement and enforce the existing legal framework, especially to enforce decisions 
remedying human rights infringements. In order to ensure the development of a 
liberal democracy the focus should be on integration rather than segregation of the 
Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Serb population. Much of the domestic situation 
inside of Kosovo is now depending on the establishment of the ASM. It also needs to 
secure an independent and active civil society. All of these are essential factors in 
the development of a democratic life.  
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 Kosovo faces large challenges in the development of a liberal democratic 
state. It is of outmost importance that it accomplishes change and improvements 
economically and institutionally. Programmatic pluralisation in politics needs to be 
pursued, along with the establishment of the rule of law. It should secure a liberal 
character by guaranteeing individual rights, equality and the protection of human 
rights, all of which are essential for a liberal democracy, Kosovo needs to develop a 
political system, which is defined not simply by free and fair elections, but also the 
rule of law, toleration, a commitment to equality, and the protection of basic liberties 
of speech, assembly, religion, and property.455 To tackle the domestic challenges is 
essential not only to liberal democracy, but also for the political and social stability 
which Kosovo needs to move forwards – both into the international community, and 
in its aspiration on joining the EU.456  
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